Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation by Abramowicz, Michael B. & Duffy, John F.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation 
Michael B. Abramowicz 
George Washington University Law School, abramowicz@law.gwu.edu 
John F. Duffy 
University of Virginia School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Abramowicz, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 337 (2008) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation 
by Michael Abramowicz* and John F. Duffy** 
 
Intellectual property protects investments in the production of information, but the 
literature on the topic has largely neglected one type of information that intellectual 
property might protect:  information about the market success of goods and services.  
A first entrant into a market often cannot prevent other firms from free-riding on 
information about consumer demand and market feasibility.  Despite the existence of 
some first-mover advantages, the incentives to be the first entrant into a market may 
sometimes be inefficiently low, thereby giving rise to a net first-mover disadvantage 
and discouraging innovation.  Intellectual property may counteract this inefficiency 
by providing market exclusivity, thus promoting earlier market entry and increasing 
the level of entrepreneurial activity in the economy.  The goal of encouraging market 
experimentation helps to explain certain puzzling aspects of intellectual property 
doctrine and provides a coherent basis for appreciating some of the current criticisms 
of intellectual property rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider two similarly situated companies.  Company A is contemplating testing 
thousands of materials to see if it can find one that could make standard light bulb filaments 
cheaper.  No one knows for sure which, if any, will work.  The testing process is expected to cost 
$100,000,000 and hold about a 50% chance of yielding a successful new technology.  If testing 
is successful and the firm gains exclusive rights to the new material over a period of years, the 
firm would gain over $200,000,000.  Company B, meanwhile, is considering promoting a more 
efficient type of light bulb that was discovered long ago but never effectively marketed.  A 
marketing campaign costing $100,000,000 is expected to hold only about a 50% chance of 
convincing consumers to accept the bulb, which produces a different tint of light from 
conventional bulbs and, though cheaper in the long run, requires higher up-front costs.  If the 
campaign is successful and the firm could have exclusive rights to newly commercialized bulbs 
over a period of years, the firm would reap over $200,000,000.1 The social benefits and costs of 
                                                 
1 We have designed the hypothetical Company B to remind readers of the experience with compact fluorescent light bulbs.  The 
basic technology associated with such bulbs is now much more than a half century old and thus in the public domain.  See U.S. 
Patent No. 2,279,635 (filed Jan. 7, 1941) (disclosing compact fluorescent bulb with coil-shaped tube and standard socket mount); 
U.S. Patent No. 2,525,022 (filed Oct. 23, 1946) (disclosing light bulb having as “its principal object . . . to provide a compact 
lighting unit or fixture including a tubular fluorescent lamp of circular shape which is readily mountable in many types of fixtures 
designed for incandescent lamps”).  By the 1980s, several companies were engaged in limited manufacturing of this type of light.  
See U.S. Patent No. 4,495,443 (filed Jan. 27, 1984).  Yet despite the long availability of the technology, such bulbs remained for 
decades a small fraction of the market.  See L.J. SANDAHL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, COMPACT FLUORESCENT LIGHTING IN 
AMERICA: LESSONS LEARNED ON THE WAY TO MARKET 5.1 (2006), http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/info/documents/pdfs/-
cfl_lessons_learned_web.pdf (noting that sales of compact fluorescent bulbs in U.S. remained below 1% of screw-socket bulb 
market through 2000 and that market share “jumped” to 2.1% by end of 2001).  The new bulbs faced numerous marketing and 
consumer information hurdles.  Id. at 2.1–2.2.  By the late 1990s, technological problems (which can be the subject of exclusive 
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providing exclusive property right are approximately equal in these two cases.2 It makes no 
economic difference whether the source of risk arises from scientific or market uncertainty.  The 
legal treatment, however, presents a paradox of differential treatment.  Company A likely can 
obtain exclusive rights, while Company B likely cannot.3 In this Article, we ask why this 
differential treatment exists, and whether it should continue to be so. 
Intellectual property law has long been understood as a means of encouraging the 
production of information in the form of technological discoveries and creative works.  Modern 
intellectual property theory, however, has generally paid little attention to information arising 
from market experimentation.4  Economists including leading twentieth-century champions of 
free markets and modern economists studying matters as seemingly diverse as high-tech 
                                                                                                                                                             
rights) had been solved in a variety of ways, but the overarching market problems remain unsolved to this day.  Existing market 
barriers perhaps could be overcome with extensive “educational and marketing campaigns,” “in-store product demonstrations,” 
and “guarantees or trusted labeling” to back up claims of long-lasting performance.  Id. at 7.2.  But with “hundreds” of competing 
manufacturers, id. at 5.1, no one firm may be able to reap any significant rewards from such efforts even if they turn out to be 
successful. 
2 In both cases, the producer of the information may receive a small expected profit and, assuming that the demand curve has a 
downward slope, consumers will collect some surplus.  The benefits may not be exactly identical because success and failure 
might have implications for other projects.  For example, success in identifying the better material might give scientists clues 
about how to search more efficiently for other new materials in the future.  There are also possible social benefits to the market 
experiment: Pioneering the market for more efficient lights might give other businesses more information about the potential 
market for other products.  The social benefits for each type of experiment might differ, but the problems of scientific and market 
uncertainty are structurally the same. 
3 See  35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2006) (precluding grant of exclusive rights for non-novel subject matter). 
4 By “market experimentation,” we mean the commercial test of a product or service that is new to the market in which it is 
launched and that has uncertain prospects for commercial success.  In using this definition, we mean to distinguish technological 
experimentation, which could occur in a laboratory and which would test feasibility as a matter of science and engineering.   
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entrepreneurship and economic growth in developing economies have long recognized a parallel 
between market and technological experimentation.5  They have not, however, explored the 
implications of that parallel.  Thus, even those who support intellectual property rights have not 
considered the possibility that such rights could be modified or extended to improve incentives 
for market experimentation, nor have they considered the possibility that various subtle features 
of current intellectual property systems may already foster market experimentation.    
Modern intellectual property theory posits that market exclusivity imposes a static cost, 
but the dynamic benefit of encouraging information production and dissemination may make this 
cost worth bearing.  This same logic applies to market experimentation.  The effective launch of 
a new product or service may require substantial investments.  Commercial success or failure 
produces information about market demand and supply upon which competitors often can free 
ride.  True, early experimenters will gain some “first-mover” advantages, as they also do in the 
case of technological innovations.  But late-entering competitors obtain two important second-
mover advantages against early market experimenters.  First, they do not have to bear the cost of 
investing in market development.  Second, they can copy the first experimenter’s market 
successes while avoiding repeating its failures.  Once such market information is created, 
consumers would benefit from competition, but without a sufficient guarantee of exclusivity it 
may be the case that no one will have enough incentive to undertake the risky initial investment 
in developing and testing the market.  Just as patents encourage risky but ultimately beneficial 
technological experimentation, some form of intellectual property protection could result in a 
socially beneficial increase in market experimentation and entrepreneurial activity. 
                                                 
5 See infra Part II. 
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We anticipate two general objections to the argument for intellectual property for market 
experimentation.  The first was voiced long ago by Friedrich Hayek as a general objection to any 
form of government sanctioned exclusive rights to promote innovation: the free market already 
provides abundant incentives to experiment and innovate.6  This “Hayekian position” draws no 
distinction between technological and market experimentation and thus would resolve the 
paradox of differential treatment present in current law by abolishing intellectual property rights 
for innovation generally.  But the Hayekian position has remained a polar position and, while 
free competition remains an important alternative to intellectual property in some 
circumstances,7 all developed nations now recognize intellectual property rights as one means for 
fostering technological experimentation.   
The second argument maintains that even if free competition is sub-optimal in 
encouraging market experimentation, the remedy of expanding intellectual property protection 
will be worse than the original disease.  This argument is more formidable than the Hayekian 
objection.  Certainly, we acknowledge that even limited, legally enforced exclusive rights may 
impose significant costs on society.  However, given the fundamental similarities between 
technological and market experimentation, it would be highly surprising if the optimal policy 
choice for encouraging market experimentation were always to rely upon whatever natural first-
mover advantages exists in a particular market and never to deploy some form of exclusive 
                                                 
6 A we show in Part II, the argument has its intellectual roots in the writings of Friedrich Hayek, whose defense of free market 
principles stressed the ability of unregulated markets to generate information and innovation through constant and pervasive 
experimentation. 
7 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002) (arguing that competition 
and patents are alternative means for fostering innovation and that patents system should be curtailed in industries where 
competition is successful in fostering sufficient degree of innovation). 
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rights, even though society generally relies on a exclusive rights to encourage technological 
experimentation.  Moroever, we observe that exclusive rights have been, and continue to be, used 
in some circumstances to encourage market experimentation.  British “patents of importation” 
were permissible for hundreds of years and present a very clear example of exclusivity being 
used to encourage experimentation with new markets.8  Exclusive franchise agreements are 
widely employed as a means by which franchisors encourage new franchisees to risk developing 
a business in new geographic locations.9  Finally, recognition that market experimentation may 
be a legitimate goal of intellectual property does not necessarily lead to an expansion of 
intellectual property right.  Since there is already patchwork, imprecise protection in the current 
legal doctrine,10 a more coherent and carefully tailored system may be able to provide greater 
encouragement for market experimentation while reducing the overall costs to society of existing 
intellectual property rights.11   
In Part III, we present our own argument that a hypothetical regime of free competition 
would provide inefficiently low incentives for market experimentation.  Admittedly, we are 
handicapped in finding empirical support for our claim that the existing level of market 
experimentation is inefficiently low, because it is difficult to measure what does not exist.  There 
                                                 
8 See discussion in text at notes 103-105. 
9  See discussion in text at notes 101-102.  
10 See infra Part IV (discussing market experimentation in current intellectual property doctrine). 
11  See text at note 184, infra, which argues in favor of restricting the existing doctrine that allows an innovation’s commercial 
success to support the validity of patents.  The alternative proposed --- limiting the doctrine so that only the patentee’s 
commercial success could be used --- may provide a more clear metric for the doctrine and reduce the number of patents 
permitted on relatively trivial developments that would have been marketed even without a government grant of exclusive rights.  
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are strong theoretical arguments, though, that incentives for innovation are insufficient.  
Industrial organizational scholars have long recognized that in many contexts, free entry will not 
lead to socially optimal entry.12  Similarly, the literature on business management has recognized 
that, while first movers enjoy significant advantages, second movers have significant advantages 
too.13  Our model focuses on the ability of a market experiment to produce information of a type 
generally ignored by the literature --- information about whether consumer demand and other 
market conditions will permit commercial success.14 Our model shows how a system of free 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. 
REV. 297, 297 & 308 (1977) (noting that, because of scale economies, a competitive market with free entry will produce a 
“suboptimal” solution while “monopoly power enables firms to pay fixed costs” and thus “the relationship between monopoly 
power and the direction of market distortion is no longer obvious”); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry 
and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 48, 57 (1986) (providing an intuitive foundation for  appreciating “the inefficiencies 
that can arise from free entry in the presence of fixed set-up costs”); Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside 
Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 154 (1979) (setting forth a model demonstrating that, under certain assumptions, the optimal policy 
for regulating industrial entry could be “either free entry or entry restricted to the point of each brand having a complete 
monopoly market”).   
13 See, e.g., Roger A. Kerin et al., First-Mover Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56 
J. MARKETING 33, 34-39 (1992) (discussing extensive economic literature about first mover advantages as well as disadvantages 
and areas where more research is necessary); Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42-47 (1988) (same).  See also id. at 47-49 (noting that “[l]ate-movers may be able to ‘free-ride’ on a 
pioneering firm’s investments in a number of areas including R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure development” and also 
“gain an edge through resolution of market or technological uncertainty”); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 270 (2007) (noting that competitors entering market after initial patentee benefit from information 
arising from patentee’s decisions, allowing second movers to apply knowledge obtained from publicly released patent toward 
more innovative products and processes). 
14 See, e.g., Michael Waldman, Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem, 54 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 301 (1987) (considering uncertainty about demand in context in which members of existing oligopoly are considering 
whether to take actions that might deter subsequent entry).  Waldman’s analysis, however, does not consider the problem of the 
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competition with no exclusive rights for market experiments may provide inadequate incentives 
to induce socially valuable experiments such as the introduction of a new (but technologically 
uninnovative) product or service or even the marketing of an old product or service to a new 
geographic market.  Intellectual property protection for market experimentation, we demonstrate, 
can raise social welfare even if the exclusive rights impose substantial deadweight losses and are 
subject to other known limitations and difficulties.  The advantages of exclusive rights seem to 
outweigh the disadvantages across a wide set of plausible assumptions. 
Furthermore, as we show in Part IV, the goal of promoting market experimentation is not 
so alien to existing intellectual property regimes as it may first seem.  Perhaps as much by 
accident as by design, our existing systems of intellectual property already include several 
doctrines that are difficult to explain unless the relevant intellectual property rights are 
recognized as partially advancing the goal of encouraging market experimentation.15  For 
example, some observers have argued that productive American industry is being overrun by 
“patent trolls,” companies that produce no actual products but that merely obtain and enforce 
patents.16  The conventional theory of the patent system maintains that the basic quid pro quo for 
                                                                                                                                                             
first entrant into a new market. 
15 F. Scott Kieff observes that patent law may promote commercialization of new technologies by offsetting second-mover 
advantages, though he does not address the possibility that intellectual property might promote commercialization in the absence 
of technological innovation.  F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 697, 708–10 (2001). 
16 See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Tired of Trolls, A Feisty Chief Fights Back, New York Times, September 16, 2006, p. C1 (describing 
“patent trolls” as firms that “[i]nstead of using [their patents] to build a commercial product, extract licensing fees from 
companies that are making and selling real products,” and asserting that such firms are responsible for patent litigation becoming 
“part of the dark underbelly of American business”); see also James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: 
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 Emory L.J. 189, 189-90 (2006) (collecting 
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obtaining exclusive patent rights is the disclosure of technology set forth in the patent document 
itself.17  Under that theory, the concern about patent trolls seems inexplicable:  Someone who 
makes a sufficient disclosure and obtains a valid patent cannot be gaming the system.  But if the 
patent system is recognized as having mixed goals—both spurring the disclosure of 
technological information and fostering actual investment in real-world market experiments—
then the concern over patent trolls makes sense.  The law should be more generous to firms that 
have both made technological disclosure in patent documents and risked assets in launching new 
businesses based on the technology.   
Existing intellectual property systems, however, do not provide well-tailored incentives 
for market experimentation.  The problem is that the granting of intellectual property 
protection—specifically, patents—is not dependent on the extent to which an innovation will 
promote market experimentation.  This holds true even with—indeed, perhaps especially with—
the modern advent of so-called business method patents.18  Such patents might be granted for 
                                                                                                                                                             
criticisms of patent trolls, which are defined as firms that “acquire[] ownership of a patent without the intention of actually using 
it to produce a product”)..  For a historical analysis showing that patent trolls are nothing new, see Gerard N. Magliocca, 
BlackBerries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007), and for the 
argument that trolls are merely traders in property rights who increase liquidity and decrease transaction costs, see McDonough, 
supra, at 204-20.  
17 J.E.M. Agric. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2002) (stating assumption that “[t]he disclosure required by 
the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude’”)(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 
(1974)). 
18 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding business 
method patent and concluding that “[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to 
the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”); see also sources cited supra note 7.  
The availability of pure business method patents has recently been placed in doubt by the decision in In re Comiskey,  499 F.3d 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), see note 20, infra. 
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innovations that are based on new technologies but that would have been created and marketed 
even without patent protection. 19  On the other hand, such patents could be refused for being 
technologically obvious, non-novel or outside the scope of patentable subject matter even though 
some grant of economic exclusivity might be needed to test them in the marketplace.20 A more 
reasonable system would be open to granting exclusive rights based on market rather than 
technological innovation, but only in those cases where the market success s truly doubtful – in 
other words, where the market success is nonobvious.  
We conclude that the reason that intellectual property theory and property rights theory 
fail to contemplate property protection for market experimentation is not that information about 
market success is a type of information that inherently needs no protection.  Rather, we argue, 
they fail to contemplate it because our property rights institutions as currently designed are 
poorly suited to afford such protection.  Institutional limitations have become theoretical 
limitations standing in the way of our clearly conceptualizing the entire subject of intellectual 
property.  This Article’s theoretical ambition is to demonstrate that market experimentation can 
produce information that, if institutional difficulties can be overcome, would sometimes be worth 
protecting much in the same way that intellectual property is currently protected.  Its practical 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (disclosing making of online purchases with single mouse click); 
see also Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that Amazon.com demonstrated 
likely literal infringement but remanding for determination of whether patent met requirement of nonobviousness). 
20 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “[i]t is thus clear that the present statute does not allow 
patents to be issued on particular business systems--such as a particular type of arbitration--that depend entirely on the use of 
mental processes”).  The Federal Circuit’s  decision in Comiskey also holds that computer implemented business methods may 
remain unpatentable if the computerization of the business method is merely “the routine addition of modern electronics to an 
otherwise unpatentable invention.”  Id. at 1380. The court was willing to disallow issuance of the patent even if the applicant 
could demonstrate “a long-felt need for the unpatentable mental process.”  Id.  
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ambition is to consider the relevance of this insight for existing intellectual property institutions 
and doctrines. 
The next Part discusses the economic literature on market experimentation and shows 
how the differential treatment of technological and market experimentation has long presented a 
puzzle to theorists.  Part IIII presents our model for why market experimentation will be 
inefficiently low without protection and then discusses different types of market 
experimentation.  In Part IV, we show that a concern for market experimentation helps explain 
several inconsistent aspects of current intellectual property doctrine and Part V concludes. 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL AND MARKET EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT  
The ability of open markets to foster entrepreneurial activity, experimentation, and 
innovation has played a pivotal role in the defense of free-market economic policies for at least a 
century.  We review that history here to make three points.  First, although technological 
experimentation is considered distinct from market experimentation in legal doctrine, the 
economic literature generally does not make the assumption that technological experiments are 
inherently different from, or more in need of legal protection than, other forms of risky but 
socially desirable testing.21  Second, most defenders of free markets, although they generally 
view such markets as superior to government-regulated central planning as mechanisms for 
fostering experimentation and innovation, have long recognized that unbridled competition is not 
necessarily the optimal policy for encouraging experimentation.  Indeed, free-market economists 
have often confronted the problem that market experimenters may not be able to appropriate a 
                                                 
21 For example, economists have long considered adjustments in price, quantity, quality, contractual terms and organization to be 
examples of potentially worthwhile experiments that may benefit society.   
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
11 
sufficient fraction of the gains from their experimentation to justify the expense and risk of the 
experiment in the first place.  This “appropriability problem” has several conventional solutions, 
none of which is considered complete.  Third, in more recent years, some economists in various 
fields—particularly those who study developing countries and entrepreneurship—have became 
increasingly impatient with the traditional solutions to the appropriability problem and have 
sought new means to address the problem.  That group of economists, however, has tended to 
accept the existing structure of intellectual property law as a given. 
By reviewing how even defenders of free markets have recognized both the similarity 
between technological and market experimentation and the limitations of the market in fostering 
an optimal amount of experimentation, we hope to counter the intuition that competition alone is 
particularly well-suited to generate experimentation in a free market.  The possibility of 
intellectual property for market experimentation is a natural extension of the more recent 
economic literature.   
A. Free Market Experimentation and the Appropriability Problem 
An intellectual connection between free markets and innovation began to be constructed 
in the early twentieth century, at the inception of what would be a pitched battle between the 
advocates of governmental control of industry and the defenders of the free market.22  Frank 
Knight, an early leader of the Chicago school of economics, saw the encouragement of 
                                                 
22  The best recounting of this epic struggle is in Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for 
the World Economy. (1998).  As Yergin and Stanislaw note, by the middle of the twentieth century, “[t]he Soviet Union enjoyed 
an economic prestige and respect in the West that is hard to reconstruct today”; admiration came “even from conservatives”; and 
“the limitations and rigidity of central planning – and, ultimately its fatal flaw, its inability to innovate – were still decades away 
from being evident.  Id. at  4.   
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“entrepreneurship or risk-taking”—i.e., experimentation—as “the central principle of the 
enterprise economy.”23 Social control of industry, he believed, was undesirable precisely because 
it could diminish risk-taking, for “the real trouble with bureaucracies is not that they are rash, but 
the opposite.  .  .  .  [T]hey universally show a tendency to ‘play safe’ and become hopelessly 
conservative,” leading to “the arrest of progress and the vegetation of life.”24   Hayek, likewise, 
thought that the true strength of the free market was its ability to make “constant deliberate 
adjustments, by new dispositions made every day in light of the circumstances not known the 
day before.”25  Joseph Schumpeter stressed the free market generates a “a perennial gale of 
creative destruction” in which productive competition comes from “the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of an organization . . . .”26  All three saw the 
dynamic process of risk-taking, experimentation, and innovation as the central strength of a free 
market and figured that the phenomenon went beyond technological advances that could be 
                                                 
23 Frank H. Knight, Socialism: The Nature of the Problem, 50 ETHICS 253, 285 (1940). 
24 Id. at 361.    
25 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945). 
26 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81, 84 (2d ed. 1950).  Schumpeter was an unusual 
defender of capitalism because he believed that the success of capitalism would ultimately lead to its demise.  There are various 
theories as to why he took that position.  It is possible that he was seeking to influence young economists who at the time widely 
believed that capitalism would soon be replaced by socialism.  His prediction of capitalism’s demise could then be seen as “bait, 
leading leftist intellectuals who would never pick up or take seriously the work of a more overt defender of capitalism to bite into 
the book.” JERRY Z. MULLER, MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN WESTERN THOUGHT 307 (2003).  Another possibility is that 
Schumpeter truly believed that socialism would prevail, even though it “would not be as efficient as capitalism,” because it 
would offer society other advantages such as greater predictability.  ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 324 
(1980).  Finally, Schumpeter’s prediction of doom may have been a call to arms for the defenders of capitalism—a position 
seemingly supported by his preface to the second edition of Capital, Socialism, and Democracy.  See SCHUMPETER, supra note 
26, at xi (remarking that prediction of doom on sinking ship may spur crew “to rush to the pumps”). 
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achieved by researchers in lab coats.  Innovation was seen as encompassing generally all forms 
of risk-taking and entrepreneurship, from new technology to new business organization to 
minutia-laden quotidian business decisions.   
Yet in championing the ability of the free market to foster experimentation and 
innovation, defenders of capitalism confront a basic problem:   Precisely because the market is 
free from governmental regulation, copycats are able to enter and thrive if an innovation turns 
out to be successful.  Their entry can drive the price of the new product or service down, thereby 
benefiting consumers but reducing profits so substantially as to prevent the experimenter from 
appropriating a sufficient fraction of the social gain to justify the experimenter’s expense in 
undertaking the risky experiment in the first place.  Thus, while individuals and firms may have 
more freedom to innovate in a free market economy than under central planning, the incentive to 
do so may well be insufficient.  
There are various possible approaches to this appropriability problem.  One derives from 
Hayek’s conceptualization of experimentation as involving “small changes”—i.e., the plethora of 
“day-to-day adjustments” that are conducted at low cost and produce optimal results through 
multiple and repetitive incremental changes.27 Paradigmatic examples would be changes in price, 
suppliers, and quantity or quality of the goods produced or ordered.28  With millions of producers 
and sellers making such adjustments continually, the result may be reasonably optimal solutions 
within the parameters of the existing market.  While Hayek appeared satisfied that this 
mechanism for innovation would be enough, incremental change does not work in all situations.  
                                                 
27 Hayek, supra note 25, at 523. 
28 Hayek listed such pedestrian adjustments as a firm’s decisions to buy “tiles for its roof” and “stationery for its forms.” Id. at 
524. 
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Small modifications to cars and trains did not lead to the airplane; little changes to aspirin did not 
lead to antibiotics; and optimizing adjustments to the traditional mail system did not produce 
FedEx.   
Although intellectual property law is a seemingly obvious solution to the appropriability 
problem, early theorists such as Knight and Schumpeter understood that the intellectual property 
protections available under the current law29 could protect only a subset of the experimentation 
that should be encouraged in a free market.  Knight viewed trade secret law and the patent 
system as important means for addressing the problem that, “owing to the low cost of 
indefinitely multiplying an idea, it is usually difficult to capitalize an increase in productive 
power.”30  As he summed it up, “[m]aking innovations is a gamble, and a lottery cannot function 
without large prizes.”31  Knight, however, recognized that existing intellectual property law 
would make it difficult for an innovator to “secur[e] any permanent gain” from an “improvement 
of business organization and methods” because such an improvement was “usually neither 
patentable nor capable of being kept secret.”32  He also recognized that these sorts of innovations 
                                                 
29 While Knight and Schumpeter wrote in first half of the twentieth century, the scope of intellectual property law has remained 
largely the same through to today.  See infra Part IV for a discussion of the current state of intellectual property law. 
30 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 372 (Harper 1965) (1921).  The desire to encourage “investment in 
invention,” Knight believed, led society to “permit[] an inventor or his assigns to keep his idea secret as long as possible.” Id.  
But, because secrecy was often “impracticable,” “the patent system has come into general use establishing and protecting by law 
a temporary, and rather short-lived, property right in the improvement.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
31 Knight, supra note 23, at 285. 
32 Id.; see also id. at 341–42 (noting that patents and secrecy were possible only in certain circumstances and that “in many cases 
no direct safeguards are available and the economic profitableness of the idea is limited to the period of time required for 
competitors to copy the new method”). 
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were a “form of progress” in which society should encourage investment.33  Yet after 
thoughtfully identifying this problem, Knight largely dodged solving it.  He asserted that “there 
is no evidence of any unwillingness to make expenditures in this form of improvement,” even 
though that “fact” was puzzling to him34  Perhaps Knight simply assumed, as have others,35 that 
the large amount of market innovation precluded the possibility that there might be inefficiently 
little of it.36  
                                                 
33 Id. (defining “the term ‘invention . . . in a broad sense” so that it includes not only “the improvement of technological 
processes” but also improvements to “methods of organization, and the like”). 
34 Id. 
35 Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy 155-56 (2d ed. 1997) ("The relatively frequent innovations in the financial services 
industry prior to the era of patentability suggest that firms had adequate means to appropriate the value of their new financial 
innovations.").  
36 Knight speculated that perhaps trademark law provided the solution—that the investment in innovative business might “yield 
a more permanent advantage through the use of distinctive brands and legal protection of trade marks and trade names.”  Id. at 
373.  Indeed, as we will argue, trademark and trade dress law are partially tailored to protect investments in innovative 
businesses.  See infra Part IV.A.  They may not, however, provide a complete solution to the problem, for trademark and trade 
dress law have been designed primarily to identify goods to consumers and the rights conferred provide only a modest barrier to 
later entrants from copying a first-mover’s success.  Knight’s speculation about trademark law concluded his examination of the 
problem, and even in his later writing he left unanswered the “interesting question[]” of why individuals would make sacrifices to 
promote progress where the resulting advances fell into the lacunae between the protections of intellectual property.  For 
example, in his 1940 critique of socialism, Professor Knight asserted that  
[i]nventions and technical improvements of other sorts, whether patentable or not, are in fact private property under the law of 
modern industrial nations, or they certainly are such for the purposes of economic analysis as long as the person who makes an 
innovation is in a position to derive any income from it in excess of the necessary remuneration of the productive agencies 
employed in putting it into effect. 
Knight, supra note 23, at 283–84.  Yet Knight did not explain how a person would obtain that necessary remuneration if the 
invention were not legally protected.  See also Frank H. Knight, Discussion, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 63, 65 (1954) (recognizing that 
any “new product or other departure” from existing status quo “involves risk” and therefore “must yield an excess, a monopoly 
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Schumpeter’s solution to the appropriability problem looked not to intellectual property 
but to market structure.  Schumpeter mentions patents and trade secrets only to remind readers 
that these are “only special cases of a larger class” of the “protecting devices” that are necessary 
complements to investment in entrepreneurial action.37  The protecting devices were various 
ways, “which most economists condemn,” for obtaining and maintaining a monopolistic or 
oligopolist position.38  Schumpeter believed the appropriability problem would be diminished if a 
market, rather than being perfectly competitive, was dominated by a few large firms or even by 
monopoly.39  The short-term cost to society would come in terms of diminished competition, but 
the long-term benefit would be greater innovation. 
To a modern observer, Schumpeter’s emphasis on market structure seems strange, since 
modern literature—even that which expressly builds on Schumpeter—views large firms as a 
potential threat to innovation precisely because they may lose their entrepreneurial powers of 
innovation and become very good imitators that “effectively barricade[] [the industry] from the 
entry and growth of small innovators.”40  Moreover, the assumption that large firms would be 
more innovative than small ones seems contrary to entire experience of innovation in, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
return, over some period to cover costs,” but failing to investigate whether existing legal structures afforded successful novelties 
monopoly return over optimal period). 
37 SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 88.  A similar theme can be seen in some of Professor Knight’s later writings.  See, e.g., Frank 
H. Knight, Free Society: Its Basic Nature and Problem, 57 PHIL. REV. 39, 52 (1948) (asserting that “a great deal of other 
monopoly is essentially of the same nature” as patent system because monopoly provides “a stimulus to devising and introducing 
useful innovations”). 
38 SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 102. 
39 Id. at 101. 
40 RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 367 (2006). 
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example, the Silicon Valley economy.41  Consequently, modern innovation policy tends to 
remain agnostic about industrial structure.  Government, it is generally thought, should reward 
innovation without regard to whether the innovation is produced by a small start-up like Google 
a decade ago or giant firm such as Google today. 
Schumpeter realized that the conventional vision of intellectual property was incapable of 
covering all the experimentation that firms could engage in.  Thus, his emphasis on market 
structure makes sense, if intellectual property rights are assumed to be significantly limited in 
their effectiveness.  Indeed, Schumpeter’s emphasis on market structure spawned an entire 
literature on the connection between market structure and innovation, a striking aspect of which 
is, in retrospect, how little attention is given to the possibility that intellectual property rules 
might be modified to address the basic appropriability problem.42  The next section reviews what 
progress, although small, has been made in the direction of adapting intellectual property rules. 
                                                 
41 The empirical support for a correlation between industrial concentration and innovation was always viewed as problematic.  
See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R & D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 925–26 (1996) (noting the long 
controversy over whether large firms are more innovative than small); F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of 
Scientists and Engineers, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 524, 530 (1967) (concluding that the relationship between industrial concentration 
and innovation is “complex” and that where industry concentration becomes too high, further concentration “is probably not 
conducive to more vigorous technological efforts and may be downright stultifying”).   
42 For example, Nelson and Winter include extensive discussions of market structure in facilitating innovation and economic 
evolution, and yet intellectual property and the patent system are barely mentioned.  Neither rates an entry in the book’s index.  
Id. at 433-35.  Patent policy is mentioned infrequently because it is seen merely as one variable affecting the rate of industrial 
imitation.  See id. at 332 (noting that patent policy can make imitation “hard or easy”).  The imitation rate is assumed to be one 
policy that can influence firm size, see id. (noting other policies that can influence industrial structure), which, in turn, is assumed 
to address the appropriability problem associated with innovation, see id. at 279 (assuming appropriability advantages of large 
firms over small ones where patent protection is spotty and imitation occurs rapidly).  Nelson and Winter thus view patent policy 
as “indirectly” affecting market structure, and market structure as affecting appropriability.  Id. at 332.  A wide swath of literature 
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B. Modern Rethinking of Market Experimentation 
More recent economic writing has shown a great willingness to conceive of economic 
ventures in virtually the same terms as experiments in engineering or technology.  This modern 
literature—especially the literature on entrepreneurship and developing economies—takes the 
congruence of market and engineering experimentation nearly to its logical conclusion.  We say 
“nearly” because, while the literature recognizes that exclusivity can foster market 
experimentation, it does not consider whether property rights should be extended to protect the 
fruits of such experiments.  Perhaps because they are not trained in the law, economists seem 
timid in recommending changes to the law.  Instead, they take the law largely as a given—as a 
constraint—and focus their attention on how market institutions respond to those constraints.   
A good example is found in the writings of Professors Shane and Venkataraman, two 
leading scholars in the study of entrepreneurship.  Following in the tradition of Schumpeter, 
Shane and Venkataraman recognize entrepreneurship as “the crucial engine” driving change in a 
capitalist society.  They also recognize that entrepreneurship is tied to the production and 
                                                                                                                                                             
takes a similar approach, considering industry structure to be one of the most important determinants of innovation.  See, e.g., 
Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 2-3 (1975) 
(noting that “[f]ew, if any economists maintain that perfect competition efficiently allocates resources for technical advance” and 
that among those “who contend that an imperfectly competitive market system is the best alternative” for encouraging 
innovation, the literature tends to focus on testing hypotheses “involve[ing] the relationships between R&D activity and firm 
size”); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395, 395 (1979) (positing “the existence of a degree of 
concentration intermediate between pure monopoly and atomistic (perfect) competition that is best in terms of R & D 
performance”); Edwin Mansfield, Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation, 71 J. POL. ECON. 556, 556  (1963) (noting that 
“[i]n recent years economists have become increasing interested” in determining “the effects of an industry’s market structute on 
its rate of technical progress”); Oliver E. Williamson, Innovation and Market Structure, 73 J. POL. ECON. 67, 67-68 (1965) 
(focusing attention on the factors by which firm size might be thought to affect innovative performance).  The alternative is to 
consider intellectual policy as a direct means of addressing the appropriability problem. 
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exploitation of new information and expressly note that the opportunities for entrepreneurship 
“need not be restricted to the technological developments.”43 The information generated by 
entrepreneurship is seen as having an appropriability problem:  The new “information diffuses to 
other members of society who can imitate the innovator and appropriate some of the innovator’s 
entrepreneurial profit.”44 Yet the legal structure addressing the appropriability problem is 
accepted as a given, so Shane and Venkataram view entrepreneurial activity as depending upon 
factors such as “[t]he provision of monopoly rights, as occurs with patent protection or an 
exclusive contract,” and “the slowness of information diffusion or the lags in the timeliness with 
which others recognize information.”45 
Similarly, another leader in entrepreneurial economics, Mark Casson, draws a creative 
connection between patents and the exclusive charters granted to English trading companies in 
the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.  Casson recognizes that the exclusive trading 
“charter conferred on the company can be regarded as the equivalent of a patent conferred on a 
technical innovation” because the charter “rewarded pioneers who collected valuable information 
about new overseas sources of supply.”46  Such rewards, Casson recognizes, “were necessary to 
compensate for the considerable costs that were sunk in collecting this information,” and without 
the exclusive charter, the “private rewards would have been dissipated by competition.”47  Yet 
elsewhere Casson accepts that, unlike scientific inventions, “[i]nformation about opportunities 
                                                 
43 Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217, 219–
20 (2000). 
44 Id. at 221. 
45 Id. 
46 MARK CASSON, INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION 245–46 (Oxford 1997). 
47 Id. 
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for trade .  .  .  cannot be patented.”48  He then considers the implications of that legal constraint 
on observable traits of firms but does not consider the possibility of eliminating or relaxing it.  
Other writers have taken a similar approach, viewing economic experiments as similar to 
technologic experiments but then considering the implications of that insight solely in terms of 
how it will affect the structure of firms.49 
Perhaps the most insightful of the modern literature is found in the field of development 
economics.  For example, Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik of Harvard precisely describe the 
basic problem of market experimentation when they note that “[i]f learning what a country is 
good at producing requires an investment and the returns to that investment cannot be fully 
appropriated, the problem faced by potential entrepreneurs in developing countries is identical to 
the problem faced by innovators in the advanced industrial countries.”50  Moreover, they 
recognize that “the policy environments facing the ‘innovators’ in the two settings are quite 
different” because the innovator in the developed country can typically obtain intellectual 
property, which “protects discoverers of new goods through .  .  .  patents,” but “the investor in 
the developing country who figures out that an existing good can be produced profitably at home 
does not normally get such protection, no matter how high the social return.”51  Indeed, 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Kirsten Foss & Nicolai Foss, Organizing Economic Experiments: Property Rights and Firm Organization, 15 REV. 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 297, 298–299 (2002). 
50 Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik, Economic Development as Self-Discovery, 72 J. DEV. ECON. 603, 605 (2003). 
51 Id. 
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developing countries are usually encouraged to promote competition and lower the barriers of 
entry, but “free entry makes the non-appropriability problem worse.”52  
Nevertheless, despite the crispness with which they identify the problem, the authors 
consider only conventional policy tools, e.g., “trade protection, public sector credit, tax holidays, 
and investment and export subsidies”,53 as possible remedies in the developing world.  As with 
the literature concerning developed economies, scholars in the field have generally overlooked 
the possibility that intellectual property rights might be tailored to address the appropriability 
problem.  In Part IV, this Article considers that possibility directly.  First, though, we present 
models of the economic ramifications of the existing problem and quantify the potential benefits 
of resolving it. 
III. MODELING THE MARKET EXPERIMENTATION PROBLEM 
Justice Holmes’s famous defense of free speech insists “that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”54 The marketplace 
analogy works because of a general assumption that markets at least succeed in sorting good and 
bad business ideas.  Indeed, we agree with Schumpeter that markets facilitate the process of 
creative destruction, ultimately promoting economic growth.55 Neither legal nor economic 
scholarship, however, pays much attention to the question of whether the degree of marketplace 
experimentation is optimal.  This Part will seek to identify various reasons that market 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
55 See generally SCHUMPETER, supra note 26. 
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experimentation may be suboptimal, while also acknowledging that there might be some factors 
pushing in the other direction.  The possibility that entry into markets may not be perfectly 
calibrated is nothing new.  The economic literature on imperfect competition has long recognized 
that there might be too little or too much entry into particular markets.56 What differentiates our 
analysis from previous inquiries is, first, that we focus on entry into new markets and, second, 
that we emphasize the uncertainty of success and the entrepreneur’s inability to prevent others 
from free-riding on information produced by market experimentation.  Ultimately, though, our 
story describes a familiar market failure:  Because market experimentation produces the positive 
externality of information, it is underproduced in the market. 
A. A Model 
1. The wedge between social and private benefit 
Our principal claims are twofold.  One, even where there are significant first-mover 
advantages, market experiments that would be socially useful may not be in the interest of any 
private party. Two, increasing the degree of market exclusivity – in effect, providing legal 
protection to increase the first-mover advantage -- can promote social welfare by increasing the 
number of experiments that private parties are willing to undertake.  To gain an appreciation of 
how large the wedge between social optimality and private incentives might be, let us consider a 
simple model, which we will develop by starting with the following baseline set of assumptions:  
A new business concept may end in success or failure.  If it ends in failure, the first entrant’s 
entire startup cost (assume for now $1,000,000) will be lost.  If it is successful, then there will be 
                                                 
56 See sources cited supra note 12.  For an analysis of the implications of inefficient entry in the copyright context, see Michael 
Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004). 
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some gross social benefit from the experiment (assume $5,000,000).  Some portion of this social 
benefit (assume 50%) will be captured by the combination of the first entrant and the subsequent 
entrants, while consumers capture the rest, paying less for the service provided than the 
maximum that they would be willing to pay.  Additional businesses may enter the market if the 
concept is successful for some cost (assume $1,000,000 for this cost also).  The number of 
businesses that will enter is the maximum possible without producing losses.57 
The first entrant will capture some expected share of the rents, while the other entrants 
share the remaining rents.58  Let us suppose, for example, that the first entrant expects to be able 
to capture 60 percent of the rents if the experiment is successful, while all other entrants would 
share the remaining 40 percent of rents.  (The 60/40 split between the first and subsequent 
entrants is arbitrarily selected but does represent a case in which the first entrant enjoys a 
considerable first-mover advantage over all subsequent entrants.)  Because we have assumed that 
consumers capture half of the social benefit, the total rents available to all potential entrants are 
$2,500,000, so the first entrant’s expected rent in the event of success is $1,500,000, and the first 
entrant’s expected profit would be $500,000.  The market would then support one additional 
entrant, and the net social benefit would be $3,000,000 (the $5,000,000 in gross social benefit 
minus the total entry costs of $2,000,000).  In the event of failure, the first entrant’s loss would 
                                                 
57 To simplify the diagrams, our model allows a fractional number of additional firms to enter the market once one firm has 
entered.  This can be conceived in expected value terms, so that entry of 2.5 firms could be interpreted as equal probabilities that 
2 and 3 firms will enter the market.  The step function discontinuity needlessly complicates the analysis, but allowing for only 
integral entry would not change any of our conclusions.  A spreadsheet that can be modified to view of the graphs here, as well as 
a variation on each of them in the absence of fractional entry, is available from the authors. 
58  In referring to “rents” here, we mean to include all returns that exceed the firms’ operating costs, including opportunity costs, 
once they have entered the market.  These rents may include quasi-rents representing merely ordinary economic returns on the 
sunk cost investments necessary to enter the market.   
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be the full $1,000,000 that was risked on performing the market experiment. If there is at least a 
25 percent or one-quarter chance of success, then this experiment will be socially beneficially, 
because at that level the expected social benefit (0.25 * $3,000,000) will just equal the expected 
cost from failures (0.75 * $1,000,000).  From the perspective of the potential first entrant, 
however, there must be at least an 66⅔ percent or two-thirds chance of success to make the 
experiment worthwhile.  At that level, the expected private benefit of success (⅔ * $500,000) 
just equals the expected private cost of failure (⅓ * $1,000,000). 
Figure 1 will consider the full range of possible values of the first entrant’s expected 
share of the rents.  The first entrant can receive anywhere from 0 (in which case success is no 
better than failure) to 1 (monopoly).  The graph illustrates the minimum expected probability of 
success that will be needed for the experiment to be socially and privately beneficial for different 
possible values of the first entrant’s expected share.  The x-axis reports the first entrant’s 
expected share of rents (in present discounted value), while the y-axis reports the minimum 
expected probability of success for there to be a private benefit and a social benefit.  
Straightforwardly, the private benefit curve has a downward slope; with a higher expected 
proportion of the rents contingent on success, a lower success probability will be sufficient to 
induce market entry.  Thus, as the first entrant enjoys a greater first-mover advantage (either 
from market conditions or legal protections), more risky but nonetheless socially valuable 
experiments will occur.  There is also a slight downward slope to the social benefit curve.  This 
is because when the share of the rents enjoyed by the first entrant rises, there is less duplicative 
expenditure for entry by additional entrants.   
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Figure 1:  Probability of success needed for experimentation to be socially and privately 
beneficial 
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The gap between the social success and the private success lines reveals the market 
failure.  Continuing the previous example, if the expected probability of success is anywhere 
between 25% and 66 ⅔ %, the experiment will be worthwhile socially but will not be attempted.  
For expected probabilities of success below 25%, the market failure makes no difference, 
because the experiment will be neither socially nor privately worthwhile.  For expected 
probabilities of success above 66 ⅔ %, it also makes no difference, as the private party will 
undertake the experiment and it will be socially beneficial.  Whether a market failure occurs thus 
depends on the first entrant’s expected share of the rents and the expected probability of success.  
The overall magnitude of this type of market failure over the economy depends on the 
distribution of these numbers across all potential projects.  If we live in a world in which all 
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potential projects have either very low or very high probabilities of success, and the first 
entrant’s expected share of rents is sufficiently high, then the market failure might seem likely to 
make little difference.  Empirical measurement of course is impossible—there is no way to 
identify all of the potential projects that no one undertakes—but it seems plausible that there are 
many potential projects in range of the middling probabilities.   
Our model is relatively simple, but our fundamental conclusion so far—that a 
considerably higher expected probability of success is needed to make experimentation privately 
feasible than to make it socially beneficial—is relatively robust to our assumptions.  Figure 2 
illustrates the effect of changing many of the numeric parameters.  As shown in Figure 2A, 
reducing the cost of the initial entry narrows the gap between the private and social minimum 
probability curves, because lower initial entry costs make the cost of the experiment less 
worrisome, while raising the cost of the initial entry increases the gap.  Decreasing or increasing 
the cost of entry for subsequent entrants (as in Figure 2B) has only modest change on either 
effects line.  Increasing the gross social benefit in the case of success (Figure 2C) decreases the 
gap, because the upside of the experiment becomes more attractive, while reducing the gross 
social benefit increases the gap.  The only possible change that would significantly alter our 
conclusions would be increasing the proportion of social benefit captured by entrants to near 1.0 
(Figure 2D).  At this level, rent-seeking eliminates the portion of the social benefit not captured 
by the initial entrant, and so the private and social benefit of experimentation are virtually 
aligned.  We find it doubtful, however, that firms will be able to achieve the perfect price 
discrimination that full private capture of social benefits would require.  Reducing the proportion 
of social benefits captured by entrants (thus increasing the portion captured by consumers) 
correspondingly increases the gap between private and social benefit. 
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Figure 2.  Effects of changing parameters of model 
Parameter Low value Baseline value High value 
Fig. 2A 
Cost of 
initial 
entry 
$500,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
$1,000,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
$2,000,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
Fig. 2B 
Cost of 
subsequent 
entry 
$500,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
$1,000,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
$2,000,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
Fig 2C 
Gross 
social 
benefit 
$2,500,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
Fi r st  ent r ant 's  expect ed shar e of  r ent s
$5,000,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
F i r s t  e n t r a n t ' s  e x p e c t e d  s h a r e  o f  r e n t s
$10,000,000 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
Fi r st  ent r ant 's  expect ed shar e of  r ent s
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
28 
Parameter Low value Baseline value High value 
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It might appear that our model is inconsistent with the common observation that many 
new businesses fail.59 There are two explanations for why risky businesses are still able to attract 
investment.  First, investors who specialize in high risk opportunities -- venture capitalists -- will 
be willing to tolerate high risk in fields where first mover advantages are strong.  Thus, we 
would expect investors to tolerate risk in those industries where various factors – including 
traditional intellectual property rights like patents, copyrights and trademarks – provide 
significant first-mover advantages, and in fact, the high-tech community of entrepreneurs and 
their capitalists have in fact developed a well-documented toleration for failure.60  Second, 
                                                 
59 Venture capitalists select investments with a high possibility of return, but also take large risks with the investments.  Because 
venture capitalists invest in business in or close to the start-up phase, venture capitalists do not have prior histories to evaluate the 
possibility of success of each business.  Therefore, venture capitalists are willing to accept the fact that many of their investments 
fail because the investments that succeed make huge profits.  See Tyzoon T. Tyebjee & Albert V. Bruno, A Model of Venture 
Capitalist Investment Activity, 30 MGMT. SCI. 9, 1051, 1052 (1984).  
60  See, e.g, Augustin Landier, Entreprenuership and the Stigma of Failure (2004) (available at 
www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/stigma9_augustinlandier.pdf).  .  
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projects having high social and private benefits will also be able to attract capital even without 
strong first mover advantages.  Consider Figure 3.  In this figure, the cost of initial entry is 
$5,000,000, and the cost of subsequent entry is $3,000,000, and the gross social benefit if the 
project is successful is $100,000,000.  Even if the first entrant is expected to earn only a third of 
the available private rents if success occurs, investing in the first mover should be profitable even 
if the likelihood of success is well below 50%.  Thus, we do not deny that, under the current 
legal regime, risky entrepreneurial businesses will be funded under certain industrial conditions 
and for certain high-valued projects.  Our point is merely that encouraging even more risky 
entrepreneurial activity might be socially beneficial.   
Figure 3.  Probabilities of success needed when potential payout is very high 
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This might appear to be an incomplete answer to the objection.  Venture capitalists would 
fund all projects over the private benefit line, and so it might seem that many of these projects 
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would have high expected probabilities of success and only a few might be close to the break-
even point.  But projects with high probability projects are likely not to exist often, because some 
venture capitalist will have funded them earlier, when they were only slightly above the private 
benefit line.  Shifting from a static to a dynamic model makes this point clearly.  Let us suppose 
that if a project is successful in year 0, the gross social benefit will be $500,000 in that year, 
rising 5% each year, and the discount rate is 10%.  The market experiment will still occur 
eventually, but it will be delayed.  Figure 4 illustrates this.  The x-axis is now time, and the 
variable previously on the x-axis, the first entrant’s expected share of rents, is now assumed to be 
0.5.  The precise amount of delay depends on the expected probability of success; if, for 
example, the probability were 0.1, then the experiment will occur twenty years too late.  Our 
conclusion that entry will tend to occur inefficiently late is robust to plausible changes in the 
parameters.61 
                                                 
61 This result is in contrast to an existing dynamic model of sequential entry in a growing market, by David Mills.  See David E. 
Mills, Untimely Entry (Product Entry on the Market), 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 659 (1991).  In his model, a firm will enter when it 
anticipates that entry will be profitable, taking into account all of the decisions by subsequent entrants.  Id. at 662–63.  Mills’s 
model shows that from a social perspective, entry can be premature or tardy.  The intuition underlying premature entry is that a 
firm entering knows that no other firm will enter until demand has grown sufficiently to make entry worthwhile.  While the firm 
might wait if it had a property right that allowed it to do so, the benefit of deterring entry by other firms may make early entry 
worthwhile.  Id. at 660.  The entrant accepts early losses for higher profits in a later period.  Mills’s analysis, however, assumes 
that potential entrants know the level of demand.  Id. at 661 (defining an inverse demand function).  At least when demand is 
highly uncertain, premature entry seems unlikely to occur, though the benefit of deterring subsequent entrants for a time in the 
event of modest success may to some extent reduce the wedge between the private and social benefits of entry. 
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Figure 4.  Delayed market experimentation in a dynamic model 
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2. The effect of intellectual property protection 
A principal effect of intellectual property protection is to increase the first entrant’s 
expected share of the rents.  This is so for two reasons.  First, exclusive rights provided by 
intellectual property guarantee at least a limited period of time in which the entrant faces no 
direct competition at all, thus increasing the first entrant’s expected share of rents in terms of 
present discounted value.  Second, the head start provided by an exclusive right may allow the 
first entrant to maintain a larger market share even after the limited term is complete.  Moving to 
the right on the x-axes in Figures 1, 2, and 3 decreases the gap between private and social 
benefit, the latter of which falls slowly as a result of the decrease in rent-seeking associated with 
reduced entry.  For relatively small expected market shares, a private party will be unwilling to 
undertake the experiment even if success is ensured, but as expected rents approach the 
monopoly level, experimentation becomes increasingly feasible.   
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It might appear that the conclusion that greater intellectual property will increase 
experimentation flows from a simplification in our model, namely the assumption that the gross 
social benefit is fixed regardless of the expected share of rents of the first entrant.  After all, a 
central drawback of intellectual property rights is that they increase deadweight loss, as higher 
prices mean that some who value goods over marginal cost nonetheless will not purchase them.62 
Indeed, we agree that a principal cost of increasing the first entrant’s expected share of rents is 
this deadweight loss.  Accounting for the negative effect of market power on social benefit, 
however, does not diminish the point that there will be a gap between private and social 
incentives for experimentation.  Figure 5 illustrates this, calculating discounted net social 
benefits for different market shares of the first entrant.  In addition to the assumptions of the 
dynamic model in Figure 4, this graph reflects that, as the market share of the first entrant 
increases from 0 to 1, deadweight loss consumes up to 40% of the gross social benefit, and the 
proportion of social benefit captured by all entrants rather than by consumers increases from 0.5 
to 0.75.   
                                                 
62 The argument that intellectual property generally creates deadweight losses is well accepted in the literature.  See, e.g., Mark 
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059 (2005) (“By definition, . . . the 
intellectual property system permits owners to raise price above marginal cost, creating deadweight losses by raising the price to 
consumers.”). 
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Figure 5:  Net social benefits as a function of first entrant’s expected share of rents, where 
increase in first entrant’s share of expected rents increases deadweight loss and producers’ 
share of surplus 
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In Figure 5, the social benefit from experimentation rises consistently with increases in 
the first entrant’s expected share of rents, although the increase levels off somewhat when the 
expected share exceeds 45%.  Given that this figure reflects a relatively pessimistic assumption 
about deadweight loss, it appears likely that the dynamic benefit of intellectual property for 
market experimentation (more experimentation) will outweigh the static cost (higher prices and 
lower output) in expected value terms.  That does not necessarily mean, however, that increases 
in intellectual property for market experimentation will always be justified.  There may be other 
costs of high expected rent shares besides the short-term deadweight loss, including losses from 
political rent-seeking63 and a reduction in downstream market experimentation.64 Let us suppose 
                                                 
63 Richard Posner has argued that political rent-seeking can be “a larger source of social costs than private monopoly.” Richard 
A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 (1975).  For the classic articles introducing 
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that these losses, plus the deadweight loss, equal 60% of gross social benefit from 
experimentation as the first entrant’s market share approaches the monopoly level of 1.0.  Then, 
past a certain point, increases in expected rent shares will decrease social welfare, as illustrated 
in Figure 6. 
Figure 6:  Social benefit where deadweight and other losses approach 60% as first entrant 
approaches monopoly 
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This suggests that any institution that seeks to grant intellectual property for market 
experimentation must seek to limit the total costs of monopoly.  Below, we will adopt an 
especially cautious approach, embracing intellectual property only where market 
                                                                                                                                                             
the problem of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 
(1974), and Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
64 Critics of the current patent system argue that the rising cost of litigation and the declining quality of patents issued by the 
PTO have resulted in uncertainty and have therefore deterred investment in innovation and intellectual property.  See NAT'L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
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experimentation seems highly unlikely to occur in its absence over the entire period of the 
intellectual property right. 
B. Caveats 
1. Cognitive factors 
In our analysis above, we assumed that although the prospective entrepreneur does not 
know whether a particular project will be successful, he accurately measures its probability of 
success.  Behavioral economics, however, suggests that many economic actors are overconfident 
about their probability of success in many endeavors, including business.  Studies suggest, for 
example, that failure rates of new entrants are high,65 and some have even suggested that, on 
average, entry tends to produce negative economic returns.66 Of course, these conclusions are 
based on private returns rather than social returns, and our analysis suggests that entrant 
overoptimism may be socially beneficial, because it will tend to reduce the wedge between 
private and social benefit seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
Entrant overconfidence may thus reduce the benefits of intellectual property, but we 
doubt that this problem is sufficiently large to undermine our general argument in any significant 
way.  While some individuals start businesses with their own money, many individuals use 
external sources of financing.  Financiers have incentives not to be overly confident about the 
likelihood of success, and there is considerable evidence of realism from the venture capital side 
                                                 
65 David de Meze and Clive Southey, The Borrower’s Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship, 106 Econ. J. 375, 377 
(1996) (reporting the “extremely high drop our rates” for new entrepreneurs in both the United States and Britain).  
66 See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
482, 490–92 (2002). 
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with regard to concerns of imitation in the market.67  The gatekeeping function of venture 
capitalists thus prevents many individuals from launching quixotic business ventures or 
continuing them in the case of follow-on financing.  The possibility of entrant overconfidence 
may thus be greatest for projects that do not receive venture capital but instead are financed by 
entrepreneurs along with family and friends.  Such projects tend to have lower market-entry 
costs which our model predicts will have higher rates of failure to begin with. 
2. Demand diversion 
So far, we have assumed that the market into which the entrepreneur is considering 
entering is entirely isolated from other markets.  Virtually all products and services, however, are 
at least partial substitutes for other goods and services.  A new product or service will owe part 
of any success that it achieves to customers who otherwise would have purchased other products 
and services.  In the industrial organization literature on product differentiation, this phenomenon 
is called “demand diversion,” or, more vividly, “business stealing.”68  More commonly, this is 
simply called “competition,” but the economic literature on imperfect competition shows that 
                                                 
67 See de Meza and Southey, supra note __, at 375 (noting that banks may have better access to unbiased information than do 
entrepreneurs); id. at 377 (citing data showing that firms having financing – especially unsecured financing – fail less frequently 
than those business seflf-financed by the entrepreneur). For further accounts of the skepticism by which venture capitalists 
evaluate projects, see Gary Rivlin, Relax, Bill Gates; It's Google's Turn as the Villain, NY TIMES, August 24, 2005 ("When I 
meet with venture capitalists, or if I'm engaged in a conversation about going into partnership with someone, inevitably the 
question is, 'Why couldn't Google do what you're doing?'); Rob Landley, A Look at Microsoft's Record: Can it Continue this 
Way?, www.fool.com, Nov. 18, 1998, available at http://www.fool.com/CashKing/1998/CashKingPort981118.htm (“These days, 
even venture capital is drying up for any new projects that might, conceivably, someday compete with Microsoft.”). 
68 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 697 
(2005) (defining “demand diversion” as “surplus cannibalized from other producers already in the market”). 
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competition does not automatically produce optimal entry.69  The literature demonstrates that 
because market entrants often do not take into account the effect of their entry on others already 
in the market, it is possible that there will be insufficient entry or excessive entry into new 
markets.70  If there is excessive entry into a market, then intellectual property protection will 
have two competing effects.  On the one hand, such protection may reduce subsequent entry, 
potentially improving efficiency; on the other, it may make more attractive the creation of a new 
differentiated product that would receive protection, potentially reducing efficiency. 
Both of these competing effects are visible in Figure 7.  This figure reflects, in addition to 
the assumption of Figure 5, the assumption that 75% of what is counted as social benefit in that 
Figure should not be so counted, for it merely reflects diversion of economic activity from 
elsewhere in the economy.  With this pessimistic assumption, there is excessive rather than 
inadequate entry, and an increase in the share of rents earned by the first entrant initially causes 
progressively greater social losses.  Past a certain point, however, cost savings are obtained by 
virtue of a reduction in subsequent entry, and at some point, the market experiment becomes 
socially beneficial rather than harmful.  Extreme demand diversion can, in sum, potentially 
complicate the case for protecting market experimentation.  Ideally, an institution granting 
intellectual property rights for market experimentation should be attentive to this concern. 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 39.  
70 See sources cited supra note 12. 
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Figure 7:  Social benefit with high demand diversion 
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C. Types of Market Experimentation 
So far, our model has been mostly abstract, identifying a benefit of market experiments 
without specifying the type of market experiments we might wish to encourage.  In this section, 
we discuss four different types of experiments:  launching a new type of good or service (a new 
product market), creating a new variety of an existing good or service (a new product feature), 
reforming an organizational or supply chain (a new supply-side approach), and selling an 
existing good or service in a new location (a new geographical market). 
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1. New product markets 
Suppose that the year is around 1997, and a venture capitalist is listening to Reed 
Hastings pitch a company that he hopes to launch.71 The company, to be called NetFlix, will rent 
DVDs by mail, placing them in envelopes to subscribers who select the movies over the Internet.  
Hastings initially plans to rent DVDs for a fixed price for a set period of time, but eventually 
may offer a deal in which subscribers can rent an unlimited number of movies for a fixed fee, so 
long as they have no more than a set number, such as three, out at any given time.  The venture 
sounds risky.  DVDs themselves are not yet a firmly established technology, and they might 
break or get scratched when shipped in flimsy envelopes in the mail.  Consumers might prefer 
the spontaneity of a visit to the video store over ordering a movie for a later time.  Late fees, on 
which video rental stores have traditionally made a great deal of money, will not be a revenue 
source.  Building a distribution center to process the envelopes could be expensive, and ideally 
there would be multiple distribution centers to minimize shipping time.  Subscriber-based 
businesses typically take a long time to build, and yet the technology may have little long-term 
viability given the continued expansion of broadband capacity and video on demand services.   
Worst of all, imagine that this new business manages to overcome all of these obstacles.  
Its success and happy customers would be difficult to hide.  Competitors could then jump into 
the business; indeed, they might have significant advantages over NetFlix.  The Blockbuster 
video chain, for example, might be able to undercut NetFlix by exploiting its existing 
relationships with movie studios.  Blockbuster also might take advantage of its many individual 
store locations by sending DVDs from them, thereby reducing the time of mail delivery, or by 
offering subscribers a chance to rent videos at Blockbuster’s bricks-and-mortar stores as part of a 
                                                 
71 See generally Gary Rivlin, Does the Kid Stay in the Picture?, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005 (providing background on NetFlix).  
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package.  Retailing giants, rich in customer brand recognition and relationships, also might 
compete.  Wal-Mart might be able to destroy NetFlix in much the same way that it outmuscles 
mom-and-pop retailers.  Massive online retailers, like Amazon.com or Dell, might crush NetFlix 
simply by executing the concept more effectively.72 A back-of-the-envelope calculation might be 
that there is only a one-in-three chance that the NetFlix concept initially will be successful and, 
further, a one-in-three chance of maintaining a sufficient market share to be more than 
marginally profitable.  With an initial cost of perhaps $100 million and small margins on each 
potential subscriber, the best case scenario would require a multi-billion-dollar consumer market 
for the investment to be worthwhile in expected value terms. 
Because NetFlix was launched and emerged as successful despite the long odds against it, 
it might seem to be a poor example with which to advance our thesis.  But in fact Netflix 
highlights the importance of having some protection against second-movers, and the riskiness of 
new businesses, even though that become highly successful.   NetFlix faced many of the 
uncertainties that plague any new entrant and that provide an advantage to second-movers:  
uncertainty about demand (would consumers be interested?), uncertainty about supply (how 
expensive would it be to turn around DVDs?), and uncertainty about competition (would 
incumbents have cost advantages?).  However, the business that NetFlix sought to create may 
also have enjoyed some important practical and legal first-mover protections.  Once Netflix built 
                                                 
72 A critic has argued that Dell succeeds by identifying the best business models and then simply executing them better than the 
originators of those models.  See Andrew Park & Peter Burrows, Dell, the Conqueror, BUS.WK., Sept. 24, 2001.  Improving 
execution of existing ideas is an important type of innovation in itself, but such business practices may discourage others from 
creating new business models at all.  If property rights in new business models existed, then those with the best ideas could 
consolidate their efforts with those best capable of conducting experiments and those best able to execute the models that have 
proven at least preliminarily successful. 
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large distribution centers, it was difficult for other start-up competitors to compete in selection 
and delivery time.  Moreover, NetFlix would also have enjoyed other network effects and 
positive consumer associations with its brand name.  Now, the large installed customer base73 
may make a customer more likely to choose NetFlix than an alternative, both because NetFlix is 
likely to be the first company that comes to mind and because the large customer base may 
improve the usability of the NetFlix product.  For example, having more customers may have 
enabled NetFlix to develop a better database from which to make product recommendations 
based on collaborative filtering for future customers. 
 In addition, Netflix also sought and obtained some broad and controversial patents on its 
business methods.  These patents may have given investors some additional degree of confidence 
that Netflix could hold off the competition long enough to earn sufficient profits to justify the 
risky investment, and in fact, Netflix did restore to suing on its patents when Blockbuster 
attempted to enter its business.74   Yet Netflix’s patents were sought and obtained prior to recent 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit rulings that have made it more difficult to patents on 
technologically obvious business methods,75 and the Netflix patents themselves were 
controversial precisely because they seemed to cover a technologically trivial process of 
                                                 
73 Netflix is the largest rental subscription service with over 6,300,000 subscribers.  Netflix, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 
(Feb. 28, 2007). 
74  See Monica Sanders, Why is Netflix Suing Blockbuster? (available at www.legalzoom.com/legal-articles/netflix-suing-
blockbuster.html).   
75  See, e.g., KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007) (overturning the Federal Circuit’s more liberal teaching-suggestion-
motivation standard of patentability); In re Comiskey, __ F.3d ___ (2007) (holding that business methods may be obvious and 
therefore unpatentable where they merely combine unpatentable business methods with computers or other well-known 
technology).   
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providing DVDs by mail.76  We have two views on the Netflix patents.  In general, we support 
limiting patents to nonobvious developments, and we are skeptical that Netflix’s patents could 
survive scrutiny under traditional patent law standards.  On the other hand, we believe that 
Netflix’s launch of its business was truly risky, and therefore we think that Netflix’s patents may 
have been socially useful in encouraging experimentation even though they are of doubtful 
validity under traditional analysis.   
NetFlix also advances our thesis because it is an example of a business that easily might 
not have been, but for the persistence of its multimillionaire founder, venture capitalists who 
trusted him in part on the basis of his past business success, and the possibility of sufficient legal 
and non-legal first-mover advantages if the venture was successful.  We cannot with certainty 
identify business ideas that would have been successful if only they had been implemented, but 
we can show how even businesses that proved to be phenomenally successful may at one time 
have appeared to be marginal projects or likely losers.  Remarkably, even after NetFlix took off 
against the odds, there were many analysts in 2002 and beyond who doubted that it would be 
able to survive competition from Blockbuster and Wal-Mart.77 
Compounding the uncertainty that companies like NetFlix face is the danger that second 
and subsequent movers may free-ride on the marketing and other promotion efforts of first 
movers.  Even if NetFlix was sure that consumers could be persuaded that it makes sense to rent 
                                                 
76 See Xenia P. Kobylarz, Netflix Screen Patent Controvery (available at 
www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_internetlaw/4_5/news/146548-1.html) (noting that the Netflix-Blockbuster patent suit 
“highlights the ongoing debate over Internet business-method patents).   
77 E.g., Martin Peers & Nick Wingfield, Blockbuster Set to Offer Movies by Mail—Rental Giant’s Shift in Approach Expected to 
Keep Prices Low; A Netflix Binge for $19.95, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2004; Ann Zimmerman et al., Wal-Mart Subscription Plan 
for Renting DVD, WALL ST. J., Oct 16, 2002.  
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DVDs by mail, such persuasion might be expensive.  Once NetFlix persuades consumers that the 
business concept is worthwhile, some of those consumers may so closely associate NetFlix with 
the concept that they will not seriously consider competitors.  78 Others, however, may research 
competitors and choose lower-cost options.  In our framework, the need to engage in marketing 
may make the entry cost for a first mover higher, thereby increasing the wedge between private 
and social benefit.  A similar analysis applies to a case in which a first entrant will need to spend 
money on lobbying.  One obstacle to supersonic travel, for example, is federal regulation of 
aircraft noise.79 Even if a particular company thinks that it can persuade Congress to change the 
rules, subsequent entrants may be able to free ride on that benefit.  We recognize, of course, that 
advertising and lobbying sometimes may be inefficient,80 but there are at least some 
circumstances in which these activities can provide information that ultimately raises social 
welfare,81 and intellectual property protection can increase the likelihood of such activities. 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 
922–923 (1988) (noting that consumers may not choose the lower price option for any number of reasons, such as acting on 
instinct instead of calculation or due to personal attachment to a product).  
79 No civil aircraft may exceed Mach 1 unless authorized for testing, and no sonic boom may reach the surface of the United 
States.  14 C.F.R. § 91.817 (2007); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 91, App. B. (2007).   
80 See, e.g., Avinash Dixit & Victor Norman, Advertising and Welfare: Another Reply, 11 BELL J. ECON. 753 (1980) (arguing 
that competitors may advertise without conveying significant information).  One argument against the efficiency of advertising is 
that monopolists may use it to protect their market positions.  See Jeffry M. Netter, Excessive Advertising: An Empirical Analysis, 
30 J. INDUS. ECON. 361, 361 (1982) (citing sources).  Our argument indicates that such advertising could be efficient in some 
cases, though perhaps second-best relative to a regime in which government directly protects market innovators. 
81 See, e.g., Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) (defending advertising as 
providing consumers useful information).   
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
44 
2. New product features 
In a similar way, the introduction of new product features can be hampered by the fear of 
immediate imitation.  A producer faces many of the same uncertainties about the demand, supply 
and competition when considering the introduction or development of a particular product 
feature.  If the WordPerfect word processing program included a new feature that proved to be 
popular among users—say, a search feature allowing the user to search for portions of a 
document containing a number of words not necessarily in order, as on search engines like 
Google—then Microsoft might well incorporate that feature as well in its competing Word 
program.  One would not expect this to stop innovation altogether, in part because introduction 
of a new feature gives the innovator a lead-time advantage.  A software company with a 
successful new feature may be able to gain market share while others take time to catch up.  
Nonetheless, lagging companies may be wary of introducing new features that it expects the 
market leader to be able to quickly incorporate, and the leader will be able to innovate only to 
induce its customers to buy new versions of the same program. 
The inability of an entrepreneur to secure the full benefits of a market experiment with 
new product features can help explain why some seemingly obvious product features take so 
long to emerge.  A possible example is luggage with wheels, a feature that came into common 
use only in the late twentieth century.  The idea that adding wheels to luggage might be useful is 
old in the art.  Consider Figure 8, an illustration from a 1914 patent application for a device that 
secured wheels to a suitcase.82 Even such a patent would give little market exclusivity, given the 
myriad other ways one might attach a wheel to a suitcase.  (Wheels, too, are very old in the art.) 
If a market experiment with wheels proved successful, established luggage companies would 
                                                 
82 U.S. Patent No. 1,099,933 (issued June 16, 1914). 
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surely copy the innovation.  This was, of course, precisely what happened once successful 
marketing of a suitcase with wheels finally occurred.83 While we cannot eliminate the possibility 
that other factors, such as technological complications, may have contributed to the delayed 
widespread introduction of luggage wheels, the inadequacy of incentives to engage in market 
experiments seems likely to have played some role. 
Figure 8.  An illustration from a 1914 patent 
 
 
The inability to prevent second and subsequent movers from free riding on advertising 
can be a problem in the product-feature context as well.  Consider, for example, a national fast-
food chain deciding in the 1990s whether to eliminate “trans fats” from its menu.  There had long 
been scientific evidence that “trans fats” were harmful, but consumer awareness of the scientific 
                                                 
83 Leonard Sloane, Consumer’s World; The Latest in Luggage: Lightweight and Mobile, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1989; Betsy 
Wade, Practical Traveler; Luggage Takes New Turns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995.   
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research was low.84 Perhaps with sufficient advertising, a fast food chain could have convinced 
consumers of the dangers of trans fats and persuaded them to give trans-fat-free french fries a 
try, but even then, the experiment might have been a failure.  Many health innovations, such as 
McDonald’s McLean Deluxe, do not catch on among consumers.85  Not only might the chain fail 
to draw in new customers, it might also lose customers who decide that they do not like the taste 
of the new offerings.  Of course, if the experiment were successful, other fast-food chains would 
quickly copy the experiment, so the first-mover advantages might be weak.  This theory may 
help explain why it took food manufacturers so long to begin introducing products with 
negligible amounts of trans fats.  Similarly, it may also explain why automobile manufacturers 
had no interest in trying to sell cars with airbags to consumers.  While the common answer to 
problems such as this is for the government to undertake educational campaigns to inform the 
public86 or to regulate the industry, our analysis suggests that intellectual property protection 
might be a useful alternative.  Of course, we do not contend that intellectual property rights 
                                                 
84 From the 1960s to the 1980s, scientific research was inconsistent as to the effects of trans-fatty acids on overall health.  In 
1990 a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that diets high in trans-fatty acids had the least favorable 
effects on cholesterol levels.  This finding was confirmed by follow up studies throughout the 1990s.  REPORT OF THE TRANS FAT 
CONFERENCE PLANNING GROUP AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION TRANS FAT CONFERENCE 2006: UNDERSTANDING THE 
COMPLEXITY OF TRANS FATTY ACID REDUCTION IN THE AMERICAN DIETApril (Apr. 10, 2007).   
85 See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Low-Fat Food: Feeding Frenzy For Marketers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at D1; Anthony Ramirez, 
Fast Food Lightens Up But Sales Are Often Thin, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1991, at D1. 
86 See The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and CounterAdvertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1182–82 (2003) (discussing education as less intrusive approach of regulating unhealthy behaviors); see 
also Food & Nutrition Info. Ctr., Dietary Guidelines for Americans: A Historical Overview, 
http://www.nal.usda.gov/fnic/pubs/bibs/gen/DGA.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2007) (giving overview of government dietary 
guidelines). 
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should be available whenever there is a danger that third parties will free ride off the marketing 
of others.  The challenge is to define the rights in a manner that encourages beneficial marketing 
without unduly extending monopoly. 
3. New supply-side approaches 
The success of a business depends not only on the product being offered to customers, 
but also on the efficiency of the supplier’s business organization.  Management literature 
concerns itself not with what products consumers want, but with how to structure and operate the 
companies that will bring the products to them.87 Just as our modern economy has produced 
many innovative products and features, so too may it appear that it produces a plethora of 
approaches to business organizations, yet once again that does not establish a priori that we have 
the optimal amount of innovation in structuring and organizing business.  Indeed, because it may 
be particularly difficult to use conventional forms of intellectual property—such as patents or 
trademarks—to protect organizational innovations, we should theoretically expect that incentives 
to produce novel business organizations may be particularly suboptimal.  We may loosely divide 
potential organizational innovations into two types:  innovations in the processes by which a 
particular good or service is supplied, and innovations in the organizational form.   
Early nineteenth-century Canada provides an illustration of the former.88 The upstart 
North West Company of Montreal challenged the established Hudson Bay Company.  While the 
Hudson Bay Company essentially waited for animal furs and other goods to be brought to them 
                                                 
87 A popular book that reflects this literature is ROBERT SLATER, JACK WELCH & THE G.E. WAY: MANAGEMENT INSIGHTS AND 
LEADERSHIP SECRETS OF THE LEGENDARY CEO (1998). 
88 For a description of this competition, see JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR PERFORMANCE 
AND GROWTH 4–12 (2004). 
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for exchange, the North West Company established trading posts throughout Canada to 
maximize its ability to find valuable goods.  Within a few years, the North West Company took 
80% of the incumbent’s market share, but the Hudson Bay Company, which enjoyed a more 
convenient port, copied North West’s unprotected innovation and was able to win the market 
back.89  In the absence of intellectual property protection, firms that make improvements in the 
supply chain can expect competitors to copy these improvements, decreasing the attractiveness 
of experimentation.  The innovation might well have occurred earlier if intellectual property 
protection were possible. 
Historically, improvements in the organizational form have improved decisionmaking 
and thus the productivity of American business.  Alfred Chandler has explained how the “visible 
hand” of hierarchical management gradually arose in the early twentieth century to displace the 
invisible hand of the market.90 More recently, boards of directors employing collegial, 
consensus-based decisionmaking have come to play the central role in making most important 
strategic decisions for corporations.91 It is possible, of course, that the slow work of evolution has 
produced the optimal decisionmaking form, but the relative homogeneity of corporate structures 
today could also be a result of lack of robust incentives for innovation.92 Management scholars 
have predicted that low communication costs attributable to the Internet will promote the 
                                                 
89 Id. at ___.  
90 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).  
91 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) 
(explaining advantages of board in corporate governance). 
92 Innovation in corporate law also may occur too slowly.  See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 
YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003) (assessing possibility that corporate law innovations might be patentable).  
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decentralization of corporate decisionmaking,93 and others have suggested that 
“crowdsourcing”94 and “social production”95 may radically alter the conventional model of the 
firm.  Some form of exclusive rights might accelerate these developments, or at least lead to 
earlier identification of the contexts, if any, in which this approach is successful. 
In the absence of exclusive rights for market experimentation, supply-side innovation will 
still occur.  The use of trade secrets is often an effective method to protect supply operations 
because of the lower visibility as compared to new products or features.96  Alternatively, third 
parties, such as management consultants or supply chain and ERP software manufacturers97 have 
                                                 
93 THOMAS W. MALONE, THE FUTURE OF WORK: HOW THE NEW ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL SHAPE YOUR ORGANIZATION, YOUR 
MANAGEMENT STYLE AND YOUR LIFE (2004).  For an assessment of how increased reliance on prediction markets could transform 
corporate governance, see generally Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007). 
94 See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, June 2006, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html (coining term 
“crowdsourcing” to describe use of amateurs to complete needed work). 
95 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 
(2006) (arguing that the networked information economy may lead to more collaborative economic projects).  Benkler generally 
describes projects in which the participants are not compensated financially, but social production could also take place with 
compensation schemes. 
96 For example, the supply chain operations of Western companies in China are shrouded in intense secrecy.  See James Fallows, 
China Makes, The World Takes, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/August 2007 (“In decades of reporting on military matters, I have 
rarely encountered people as concerned about keeping secrets as the buyers and suppliers who meet in Shenzhen and similar 
cities.”); see also id. (“Asking a Western company to specify its Chinese suppliers is like asking a reporter to hand over a list of 
his best sources.”).  As one person who specializes in Chinese supply chains put it, “Supply chain is intellectual property.”  Id. 
(quoting Liam Casey).  “It is not easy to find the right factory, work out the right manufacturing system, ensure the right supply 
of parts and raw material, impose the right quality standards, and develop the right relationship of trust and reliability. Companies 
that have solved these problems don’t want to tell their competitors how they did so.”  Id. 
97 Who may, in turn, be deterred from innovation by competition from other software providers.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
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incentives to improve the operation of existing businesses.  Despite these sources of innovation, 
our model would still predict underinvestment in innovation if the new supply-side feature can 
not be protected by trade secrecy or is relatively easy to implement without the assistance of 
experienced consultants.98 
4. New geographical markets 
The same logic applies to introduction of a new product, new product feature, or new 
supply-side approach into a new geographical market.  We will see below how exclusive rights 
have historically promoted international technology transfer,99 but the principle theoretically can 
also apply to technologically hum-drum products and on a local level.  Consider, for example, a 
decision whether to open the first Ethiopian restaurant in a small city called Podunk.  There may 
be some questions about whether Podunkians are ready for Ethiopian food, but if they turn out to 
like it, there might be enough market share for more than one restaurant.  Once again, then, a 
potential trailblazing entrepreneur faces the entire downside of an initial investment but must 
share some of the upside with future entrants.  Perhaps a cunning restaurateur will be able to 
expand the restaurant or quickly open a second if the concept is successful, but for some types of 
restaurants, the optimal economy of scale is a single restaurant, so that the chef can keep careful 
watch over the kitchen.  Even where the initial entrepreneur is incapable of expansion, an 
intellectual property right could encourage innovation, because the owner of a successful new 
restaurant concept could collect royalties from a subsequent entrant. 
                                                 
98 Even in the presence of additional protection as advocated in this paper, one would still expect underinvestment in innovation 
because of the generally conservative approach by businesses to their structural features due to issues with entrenched interests 
and other agency and risk aversion issues.    
99 See infra notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
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We doubt that the restaurant example provides the strongest example of the claim that 
incentives to experiment are suboptimal, in part because in some cases it may not be plausible 
that a geographical area could possibly support more than one restaurant featuring a certain 
ethnic cuisine.  In addition, the experience of Ethiopian restaurants in other cities and the 
experience of other ethnic restaurants in Podunk may make the demand for Ethiopian cuisine in 
Podunk relatively certain ex ante.  On the other hand, this point cuts both ways.  Podunk’s 
potential entrepreneur does not take into account that the experiment in Podunk may provide 
information that will help entrepreneurs in other similar cities decide whether to open Ethiopian 
restaurants.  It may be that no one will open a restaurant in any of several similar cities until 
there is evidence of success in at least one.  In addition, there may still be considerable 
uncertainty not only about whether those opening the restaurant can execute the concept well 
enough for it to be successful,100 but also about what specific innovations may be needed to make 
Ethiopian food palatable to Podunkians. 
The desirability of public protection of entry into new geographic markets can be seen in 
franchising.  Franchise agreements routinely include grants of geographical exclusivity to 
encourage entrepreneurs to experiment with entering, and investing in, new and uncertain 
markets.101  The franchisor recognizes that a franchisee will be more willing to risk entry into the 
                                                 
100 We accept that much of the uncertainty associated with new restaurants is associated with uncertainty about the quality of the 
management and the chef, but the restaurant business is not as unpredictable as commonly believed.  See, e.g., Kerry Miller, The 
Restaurant-Failure Myth, BUS. WK., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1; H. G. Parsa et al.  Why Restaurants Fail, 46 CORNELL HOTEL & REST. 
ADMIN. Q. 304 (2005) (concluding that restaurant failure rate within the first year is about 26%, not the reported 90%, and 
restaurant failure after three years never exceeds 60%). 
101 Pierre Azoulay and Scott Shane observe that territorial exclusivity provisions are common in franchising agreements and that 
they lead to a lower failure rate for new franchising systems.  See Pierre Azoulay & Scott Shane, Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and 
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market, and also to invest more in entering, if, in cases of wild success, that first franchisee will 
be legally insulated to some extent from copy-cat competition. 
IV. INTEGRATING MARKET EXPERIMENTATION INTO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY 
Our analysis in Part III shows that intellectual property rights for market innovations can 
increase social welfare by counterbalancing first-mover disadvantages and thus encouraging 
market experimentation.  Yet intellectual property doctrine and theory appear to pay little 
explicit attention to this concern.  Market experimentation is not recognized as being a type of 
benefit that might justify the “embarrassment” of exclusive rights, even though intellectual 
property rhetoric tolerates such grants in other circumstances where there is some offsetting 
benefit, such as reduced consumer search costs or scientific innovation.102 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Failure of Young Firms, 47 MGMT. SCI. 337 (2001).  Azoulay and Shane conclude that the failure to adopt such exclusive 
arrangements among some new franchisors is best explained by “their limited knowledge of contracting [which] leads them to 
overlook the importance of the franchisor encroachment problem when designing their contracts.” Id. at 356; see also Arthur H. 
Travers, Jr., and Thomas D. Wright, Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795, 
795 (1961) (“The three broad types of contractual arrangement by which manufacturers have traditionally sought to channel the 
activity of their distributing outlets are the exclusive franchise, the territorial restriction, and the customer restriction.”). 
102 Although Thomas Jefferson famously biased the issue by referring to “the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.” 13 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861), commentators frequently recognized that intellectual 
property protections can be justified if the benefits exceed the costs.  See, e.g., J. A. K. Huntley & Frank H. Stephen, Unfair 
Competition, Consumer Deception, and Brand Copying: An Economic Perspective, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 443, 451 (1995) 
(finding trademark protection justified so “long as such expenditure is less than alternative consumer search-and-testing costs”); 
Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 699–700 (1993) (arguing that patents are 
necessary for encouraging research and development). 
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Exclusive rights to protect market experimentation are, however, not without precedent. 
In industrializing Britain103 and other countries,104 “patents of importation” gave exclusive rights 
to a party that first imported and commercialized products and processes from another country.  
Indeed, the patentee need not have had any claim to have been an independent creator of the 
technology.  Many commentators have viewed patents of importation as being a misguided 
mercantilist policy because, unlike modern patents, those exclusive grants did not necessarily 
produce new technological information.105 Yet that assessment overlooks that the goals of these 
patents was to encourage, not technological experimentation.106  While patents of importation 
                                                 
103 The early British patent system began with the granting of letters patent by King Edward III to foreigners who wished to go 
to England to teach the English their respective trades.  In the sixteenth century, the crown began to offer letters patent to English 
citizens for manufacturing monopolies in England.  Though the Crown’s power to grant of letters patent was substantially 
circumscribed in 1623 by the Statute of Monopolies,, 1623, 21 Jam., ch. 3 (Eng.), that statute continued to allow patents on any 
novelty process or manufacture, and a process or other technology was considered “novel” if it was  new to the country.  See 
generally Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 
(2001) (providing historical discussion of British patent practice). 
104
 EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 314 (2002). 
105 See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra note 104, at 374–75 (arguing that discovery or invention that is non-novel—as patent of 
importation must inherently be—fails to “promote the progress of useful arts”); Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, 
and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1338 (2005) (arguing that both patents of importation and exclusive trading 
charters were facets of mercantilist policy that are not consistent with modern U.S. legal norms); Margo A. Bagley, Patently 
Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 685–86, 696 (2003) 
(arguing that patent system is constitutionally obligated “to avoid granting of patents on ‘old’ information and that patents of 
importation and even geographic restrictions on the prior art considered in evaluating a patent are unconstitutional); see also 
Margo A. Bagley, Still Patently Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Nard, 88 MINN. L. REV. 239, 241–42 (2003). 
106 See id. at 314 (explaining that professed goal of patents of importation was minimization of risk involved in importation of 
European manufacturing technology to nascent United States).  Alexander Hamilton similarly argued that “to the extent that 
importation benefits society to the same degree that invention does, it ought to be rewarded by exclusive rights in a similar 
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were abandoned in the nineteenth century, the survival of the system through more than a 
century provides a clear historical precedent for using exclusive rights to foster market 
experimentation.    
Nonetheless, the goal of generating market experimentation can help justify various 
modern intellectual property doctrines.  Perhaps as importantly, market experimentation can help 
unify seemingly discordant doctrines across many areas of intellectual property law, providing a 
justification relevant not only for copyright and patent protection but also for trademark and 
trade secret protection.  These areas have fallen under the same umbrella of “intellectual 
property” solely because of the intangible nature of the property right, despite differences in 
underlying theoretical justifications.  The goal of market experimentation is relevant to each area 
of intellectual property and, consequently, might help to bridge the gaps between them to form a 
more consistent theory of intellectual property protection across the doctrines. 
In this Part, we aim to explain how these existing intellectual property regimes may 
reinforce the goals of market experimentation and how that goal explains certain seemingly 
peculiar features of the law.  Several caveats are in order.  First, we do not claim that the goal of 
market experimentation is the only, or even the dominant, goal in each area of intellectual 
property.  We merely contend that each of the regimes advances this purpose to some extent.  
Second, although the aim of market experimentation can help explain some intellectual property 
doctrines and trends, we do not claim to be offering a comprehensive positive theory of 
                                                                                                                                                             
manner.” Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 
865 (1998).  Nonetheless, early American patent statutes were not seen, even by Hamilton, as authorizing patents of importation.  
Id. at 864.  Indeed, the legislative history of early congressional debates reveals that a provision that would have authorized 
patents of importation was deleted.  Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 
25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 501–02 & n.206 (1997) (noting that the United States was first country not to allow patents of importation). 
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intellectual property law.  Indeed, we suspect that there are many doctrines that seem 
inconsistent with the idea of encouraging market experimentation,107 and an aspiration of our 
analysis is to urge that some such doctrines be reconsidered.  Third, we do not even claim to be 
offering a comprehensive defense of doctrines that do advance the goal of market 
experimentation.  For example, we will argue that although business method patents may 
encourage efficiency by promoting market experimentation, patent doctrine generally is not well 
tailored to encourage market experimentation, and under existing patentability standards, 
business method patents could well do more harm than good. 
We will proceed from areas in which the importance of experimentation is less obvious to 
those in which it might be more obvious, highlighting the relevance of market experimentation to 
areas of intellectual property law in which it might at first appear to be entirely irrelevant.  
Trademark and trade secret have generally been seen as areas of intellectual property law with 
their own unique goals,108 but the market experimentation justification connects them both to 
each other and to patent and copyright law.  In these latter areas, the goal of encouraging 
experimentation (though not market experimentation) is perhaps more obvious, so our analysis 
will be less revolutionary.  But our analysis is most important in these areas, particularly in 
                                                 
107 For example, United States patent law has long eschewed any requirement that the patentee engage in any efforts to 
commercial or otherwise to “work” the patented technology.  See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co, 210 U.S. 
405, 429 (1908) (noting that since 1836, Congress has chosen not to impose any working requirement in U.S. patent law and 
holding that patentees may “use or not use” their inventions without losing their rights to enforce their patents).  That aspect of 
patent law cannot be justified by the goal of encouraging market experimentation.   
108 See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) (“The 
justifications for trademark law are different from those for other forms of intellectual property”).  
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patent law, which has the greatest potential to serve as a regime that—at least in theory—could 
self consciously promote goals of market experimentation.   
A. Trademark 
Trademark theory has generally been understood as a doctrine that economizes on 
consumer search costs.109  While recognizing the centrality of consumer search to trademark law, 
we also believe that trademark law helps foster market experimentation.  Trademarks (along with 
service marks and trade dress) are central to allowing an entrant into a new market to maintain 
market share in the face of competition.  If, for example, any competitor were permitted to use 
the label “NetFlix” to describe services similar to NetFlix’s, then NetFlix likely would lose 
market share much more rapidly and completely once competitors saw the company’s initial 
success,110 because the NetFlix product would seem less distinctive and attractive.  The goal of 
encouraging market experiments like NetFlix, however, provides an additional justification for 
trademark protection. 
                                                 
109 Once consumers associate a particular trademark with a particular source, preventing competitors from using that trademark 
allows consumers to purchase goods or services associated with the mark without having to engage in further investigation to 
confirm quality of the source.  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 167–68 (2003).  See also Lemley, supra note 117, at 1690 (noting that trademarks “communicate valuable 
information to consumers, and thereby reduce consumer search costs”) 
110 This effect would occur even if the law allowed the “true” or “original” Netflix to identify itself uniquely in some way so 
that consumers could distinguish, with minimal effort, the original from the copyist NetFlixes.  For example, trademark law 
might be limited only to protecting the use of the word “original,” a word that has occasionally led to legal disputes.  See, e.g., 
John Tierney, In a Pizza War, It’s 3 Against The Rest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991 at A1.  (discussing dispute among many 
“original” Ray’s Pizza restaurants). 
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Our approach serves as an extension to a related, though less prominent, justification in 
trademark theory:  Trademark helps protect producers’ investments.  Producers can safely make 
additional investments in existing goods or services, perhaps using advertising to inform 
consumers of the benefits of product improvements, without worrying that consumers will be 
unable to identify the improved product.111 Similarly, producers can extend trademarks to related 
product areas, allowing consumers to draw quality inferences even about products that they have 
never consumed or heard about before.112 
A traditional criticism of this justification is that it may create deadweight costs by 
inducing over-investment in advertising and marketing to create a “spurious image of high 
quality” and, consequently, allowing trademark owners to charge higher prices over generic 
products.113  In their classic analysis of the economics of trademark law, William Landes and 
Richard Posner note that prices for brand-named goods have “seemed to some economists and 
more lawyers an example of the power of brand advertising to bamboozle the public and thereby 
promote monopoly.”114  Landes and Posner point out that the presence of differentiated prices 
between brand and generic products may not imply deadweight costs if the basis for the 
difference is that consumers are paying extra for guarantees of high quality manufacturing or to 
avoid the expense of determining whether alternatives are in fact of equal quality. 115  The 
                                                 
111 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–270 (1987). 
112 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 823 (1926) (introducing this 
theory). 
113 Id. at 274. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 275 (arguing that “[t]he fact that two goods have the same chemical formula does not make them of equal quality 
to even the most coolly rational consumer.”).  Landes and Posner also note that the concerns have not actually influenced 
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absence of empirical evidence showing that generic drugs have dramatically inferior quality as 
compared to brand drugs,116 however, makes Landes and Posner’s empirical claim difficult to 
verify. 
Our justification provides a more satisfactory response to the argument that there are 
deadweight costs associated with trademark protection.  Unlike the classic justification, our 
justification does not depend on empirical evidence as to differences in quality between generic 
and brand products.  Suppose that it could be shown that the application of trademark law in 
some identifiable set of cases reduced short-term consumer welfare because consumers 
irrationally overestimated the quality benefits of purchasing from the most familiar brand.  
Landes and Posner would then need to recommend relaxation of trademark rules, unless some 
second-order consideration (such as litigation costs) was sufficient to save the doctrine.117  In 
contrast, we argue that trademark serves a useful function even if many consumers, acting solely 
in their own private interests, are irrationally brand loyal.  If there is some static inefficiency to 
consumers’ preferences for brand names, market entrants will expect a greater market share and, 
therefore, engage in more market experimentation.118  This point is familiar to the literature on 
                                                                                                                                                             
trademark, as opposed to antitrust, doctrine.  Id. at 274–75. 
116 The Food and Drug Administration requires that, to be approved for use, a generic drug meet standards to show the generic is 
equivalent to a brand-name drug that has already gone through the regulatory process.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).  
117 Landes and Posner suggest that trademark law is appropriate because consumers are willing to pay more for the trademarked 
brand because the consumer is saved the cost of searching, and because legal protection is needed to prevent free-riding.  Landes 
and Posner do not discuss the possibility that consumers irrationally overestimate the value of trademarked goods.  See Landes & 
Posner, supra note 109, at 166–209. 
118 Theoretical economic models recognize but may sometimes understate the extent of brand-name preferences.  For example, 
under one model, the first mover will have greater market share only proportional to the customer base that was established prior 
to the second mover’s entry.  See Jean Gabszewicz et al., Sequential Entry with Brand Loyalty Caused by Consumer Learning-
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first-mover advantages, but that literature does not explain that this greater market share may 
itself be a social benefit by providing a dynamic incentive to engage in market experimentation. 
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman contend, in a similar fashion to our 
argument, that trademark law can usefully “leverage” patent protection.119  Brand loyalty among 
consumers allows producers to earn supracompetitive rents even after the patent expires, 
increasing the benefits of investments in research and development.120  Meanwhile, trademark 
law imposes relatively little social welfare cost.  To the contrary, producers have an incentive to 
increase output and lower prices during the patent period to increase their market share during 
the trademark period.121  Furthermore, there need be no deadweight costs in the trademark period, 
because those consumers who find the price of the previously patented good too high can opt, at 
some small search expense, for competitors’ lower-priced products, such as generic drugs.  
Siegelman and Parchomovsky thus question Supreme Court doctrines that seek to prevent 
patentees from using trademark on functional characteristics to extend patent protection.122 
                                                                                                                                                             
by-Using, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 397, 400–01 (1992).  In many contexts, it is possible that new customers will prefer the established 
product even absent evidence of superior quality. 
119 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 
(2002).  
120 Parchomovsky and Siegelman argue that allowing trademark protection to extend beyond patent life encourages companies 
to create brand loyalty and therefore reduce monopolistic prices.  Id. at 1473–74.  If products were not trademark protected after 
patent life, any company could produce a copy and market the product under the same name.  Id.  Therefore, without trademark 
protection, the first mover would have no incentive to price competitively while the product is patent protected.  Id. 
121 Id. at 1473–81. 
122 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a product’s functional features cannot be trademarked to extend protection 
after the expiration of a patent.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001) (finding that prior 
patenting provides strong evidence of functionality, which precludes trademark protection); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
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Our argument extends the logic of Siegelman and Parchomovsky beyond research and 
development to include garden-variety market experimentation and the commercialization of 
products that may not themselves be particularly technologically innovative or may have long 
been known to those skilled in the art.  Indeed, trademark’s capacity to leverage patent and other 
forms of intellectual property protection is a byproduct of its more general capacity to increase 
first-mover advantages and thus to generate greater incentives for market experimentation of all 
types, including but not limited to technological experimentation.123  As Siegelman and 
Parchomovsky argue, this type of trademark protection (unlike the stronger intellectual property 
protection discussed later in this paper)124 has only a small risk of causing deadweight loss.125 
Our analysis suggests that trademark law, perhaps entirely by accident, already helps to 
advance the goal of market experimentation.  At least four seemingly odd features of trademark 
law are more justifiable in light of our theory.  The first is the so-called “initial interest” line of 
cases, in which a firm uses a competitor’s trademark to generate “initial interest” in the firm’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (noting that the functionity doctrine prevents trademarks “from inhibiting legitimate 
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature”); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
863 (1982) (White, J., concurring in result) (“A functional characteristic is an important ingredient in the commercial success of 
the product, and, after expiration of a patent, it is no more the property of the originator than the product itself.” (citations 
omitted)).  We do not necessarily agree with Parchomovsky and Siegelman’s criticism of the functionality doctrine because, if 
trademark law were to cover functional aspects of a product, then the trademark might create more significant deadweight loss by 
forclosing the possibility that competitors could market equally viable alternative products. 
123 Previous commentators have recognized some forms of market experimentation that trademark protection encourages but 
have not paid adequate attention to the risks associated with costly market entry.  For example, Landes and Posner note that 
trademark protection creates incentives to invest in “new words or symbols or . . . design features.” Landes & Posner, supra note 
109, at 169. 
124 See infra Part IV.C (discussing copyright) and Part IV.D(discussing patents).. 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 113 and 118. 
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own product.126  Many courts have held such practices to be trademark infringement even in the 
absence of any evidence that consumers would do business with the firm under the mistaken 
belief that the firm was its competitor.127  Rather, the courts have justified finding trademark 
infringement on the theory that the use of a similar trademark or name would allow the firm to 
gain “crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.”128  Such holdings have been roundly 
criticized in the literature as unjustifiably departing from the basic theory on which trademark 
law is conventionally based.129  Our theory, however, rehabilitates such decisions.  Indeed, under 
our view, a second-mover’s use of a first-mover’s trademark is socially undesirable precisely 
                                                 
126 “The rationale for [the initial interest] rule is that the defendant should not be allowed even to get his foot in the door by 
means of deception.  Once in, he may stay and thereby profit from his wrongdoing.” 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 22:11.50 (4th ed. 2007). 
127 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Initial interest confusion exists as a 
matter of law as to Nissan Computer’s automobile-related use of “nissan.com”‘nissan.com’ because use of the mark for 
automobiles captures the attention of consumers interested in Nissan vehicles.”); Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 
964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002) (establishing six-part test to determine if confusion exists between two trademarks); Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that district court had not found that “a third party would do 
business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil”). 
128 Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 259. 
129 In criticizing the initial interest confusion doctrine, commentators have sometimes noted that an argument of favor of the 
doctrine is that it protects businesses’ investments in goodwill.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the 
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 613 (2006) (arguing the use of initial interest confusion as a basis 
for trademark infringement in Internet usage cases does not fit with the functional goals of trademark law, but is a way to prevent 
infringers from free-riding on others’ goodwill).  But commentators have not explained that the reason to protect goodwill is that 
such protection might encourage market experimentation, and they have generally found the “goodwill” argument to be wanting.  
See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
105, 162 (2005) (calling goodwill argument a “visceral reaction [that] flies in the face of basic free market principles which 
allow, and in fact demand, that competitors be able to benefit from value created by others”). 
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because the use of the mark does lower consumer search costs and thus increases the risk that a 
consumer will not choose the first mover’s product. 
Second, courts are generally reluctant to commit “genericide” by concluding that a 
trademark has become generic.130  Everyday language suggests that “Q-Tips” and “Rollerblades” 
are used as generic terms by many consumers, and yet they persist as trademarks.131  Scholars 
have long noted the law’s reluctance to invalidate existing trademarks as generic and have 
argued that this aspect of the law cannot be reconciled with trademark’s goal of reducing 
consumer search costs.132  We agree with that argument but nonetheless believe that courts  
should keep genericide rare, because the first-mover advantages provided by such trademarks 
encourage market entry for future potential products.  Although any calculus involving stimulus 
to innovation and search costs will necessarily be imprecise, our analysis suggests, for example, 
that the phrase “Band-Aid” should remain trademarked.  We suspect that many consumers 
                                                 
130 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc, 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that “Coke” is not generic); In re America 
Online, Inc., 2006 WL 236389 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.) (Aug. 2005) (deciding that “INSTANT MESSENGER” is not 
generic). 
131 See, e.g., Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that “Q-Tips” constitutes trademark 
subject to protection by law); Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out a Luxury Claim and a 
Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 205, 214 (2007) (citing “Rollerblade” as trademark that owner must protect diligently, so 
it does not become generic). 
132 Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1358-59 (1980) (noting that 
“[c]onsumers face enhanced search costs and risks as a result of the claim of exclusive rights to generic words” and arguing that 
the “legal tests of genericness … do not adequately take into account relevant economic considerations”); Deven R. Desai & 
Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1844 (2007) (arguing that the law of 
genericism should focus on “whether the putative mark is serving as a source identifier in the marketplace” and that, if it is not, 
then it should be viewed as generic and unprotectable);  see also Lemley, supra note 117, at 1696 n.40 (observing that “[c]reating 
circumlocutions to avoid [generic] trademarks is costly”).  
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
63 
purchase this brand of adhesive bandages simply because it is the only one that uses the phrase 
“Band-Aid.”133  Price-conscious consumers, however, can still choose other brands, so we doubt 
this preference produces significant efficiency losses.  Meanwhile, the profits that Johnson & 
Johnson continues to earn as a result of this consumer preference will encourage other innovation 
in the future.   
Third, courts have been increasingly been willing to extend trademark protections to 
trade dress and product configurations, and commentators have also criticized this trend as 
extending trademark protections beyond the level needed to advance the traditional interest in 
permitting consumers to identify the source of goods.134  Once again, we agree with other 
commentators that trademark law may well be exceeding its traditional justifications in this area, 
but we believe the change is salutary.  The expanded law of trade dress protection allows a firm 
engaging in a market experiment to dress the innovative product in a design that is “inherently 
distinctive” (so that it will be assured of legal protection135) and that is sufficiently memorable 
                                                 
133 See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 132, at 1340-46 (noting that many consumers may use trademarked words such as 
Plexiglass, Thermos, and Teflon when they actually want any product from the generic category and that competitors to the 
trademarked good may have a difficult time competing because they need first to educate consumers that the generic is the same 
as the trademarked).  
134 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 108, at 1700-01 (noting the expansion of the law in this respect and arguing that, under recent 
court decisions, “the link between product configuration and consumer source identification has all but disappeared”); see also 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 387 (1999) (asserting that the trade dress cases, coupled with 
other recent developments, “have created an environment that welcomes claims based on little more than a defendant’s imitation 
of a successful product”).   
135 See Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana Restaurant, 505 U.S. 763, 770 (1992) (holding that “inherently distinctive” trade dress is 
subject to protection under the Lanham Act without any proof that the trade dress has acquired “secondary meaning” – i.e., 
without proof that consumer uniquely associate the dress with a specific source).   
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for the consumer to associate the product with the design.  If the market experimentation is 
successful, second-movers will face a barrier to entering the market because they will have to 
convince consumers that a product with quite different appearance is functionally the same as the 
known product.  Trade dress protection can thus give the first-mover some reward for the risk of 
the market experiment while also creating an incentive to curtail deadweight losses:  The first-
mover will realize that if it tries to charge to much for the successful product, consumers may 
educate themselves about competing products.   
Finally, our theory makes the cause of action of trademark dilution136 seem less alien to 
trademark law.  The most common dilution concern is that use of a famous mark by a junior 
user137 for unrelated products -- say, footballs branded as Harley-Davidson (or even just 
Harley138) -- may “blur” the famous mark, diminishing its branding power.  The dilution action 
has been controversial,139 perhaps largely because the concerns of dilution seem largely 
                                                 
136 The dilution cause of action explicitly protects branding, barring actions that may dilute a trademark even in the absence of 
any evidence that such dilution will cause consumer confusion.  Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 
109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).  See also Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: 
Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2006) (noting that the “notion of protecting the inherent 
value of the trademark from dilution was singularly antithetical to the consumer confusion emphasis of trademark law).  
137 A junior user is one who enters the market after the trademark holder. It is consistent with our theory that dilution law does 
not apply to senior users, who entered the market before the user whose use made the mark famous. 
138 Ronda Ag v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 3597 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 1997) (unpublished order affirming the 
Patent & Trademark Office’s cancellation of the mark “Harley” for watches even though the appellant Ronda had been using the 
mark on its watches for several years).   
 
139 See, e.g., Kathleen B. McCabe, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2000) (discussing judicial skepticism toward dilution cause of action); Lemley, supra note 117, at 
1698 and 1714 (using dilution doctrine as “the most obvious example of doctrinal creep in trademark law” and calling on courts 
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independent of the traditional goals of trademark of minimizing consumer search costs.140  The 
action, however, makes more sense from a market experimentation perspective.  By protecting 
brand value built from market innovation, our theory provides a more solid justification for 
dilution protection.  First, the higher anticipated value that dilution protection confers on 
successful brands increases the incentives to engage in market experiments.141  If a manufacturer 
can figure out a combination of features that consumers greatly desire, it is rewarded with the 
additional protection conferred by trademark law.  Moreover, the mark holder may have an 
incentive to maintain a high reputation and reasonable prices.  If consumers are not well satisfied 
with the trademark owner’s products or believe that the goods are overpriced, they may lose the 
positive assessment of the trademark owner necessary to generate sales of the relevant licensed 
goods.  Second, the dilution cause of action preserves the mark holder’s ability to use the mark 
on entirely new goods and services, increasing anticipated market share and thus the 
attractiveness of market entry.  For example, Harley-Davidson could lend its name to a novel 
approach for a vacation resort (perhaps one that caters to the tastes of Harley motorcycle 
owners), with the trade name making it slightly harder for second-movers to free-rider in the 
event of success.  These arguments suggest that courts should perhaps not be too stingy in 
                                                                                                                                                             
“to impose significant limitations” on the marks eligible for dilution protection).  
140 Id. at 1698 (noting that “because consumers do not have to be confused for dilution to occur, dilution law represent a 
fundamental shift in the nature of trademark protection”).  For example, no one seems likely to purchase Harley footballs based 
on a belief that the brand necessarily identifies the source of the goods,  and the existence of such footballs made by an entity 
other than the motocycle manufacturer would not seem to make it more difficult for Harley to convey to the public any 
improvement in its motorcycles. 
141 Cf. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (“Others who see the watches bearing the Rolex trademarks 
on so many wrists might find themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine [Rolex] because the items have become too 
common place and no longer possess the prestige once associated with them.”). 
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determining that a mark is sufficiently famous to qualify for the dilution cause of action,142 
although we recognize that the limited number of attractive potential marks means that courts 
should not prevent use of a relatively unknown mark for unrelated products. 
B. Trade Secret 
One of the common justifications for trade secret law is that it serves a purpose similar to 
the patent system:  Protection of secrets encourages firms to invest in the production of valuable 
secrets and thus in technical and scientific advances.143  Yet this theory has some important 
difficulties.  First, one of the main policies of the patent system is to ensure that non-obvious 
technical information is made public and is not kept as a trade secret.144  A firm can pay a heavy 
price for maintaining non-obvious technological information as a trade secret including the 
possibility that another firm may patent that information and enjoin the original creator’s use.145  
Second, it seems puzzling that the law should seek to protect technical advances that are so 
minimal that they would not qualify for patent protection, presumably because they are obvious.  
A partial answer to this puzzle is that trade secret protection avoids the transaction costs 
                                                 
142 See, e.g., Monica Hof Wallace, Using the Past to Predict the Future: Refocusing the Analysis of a Federal Dilution Claim, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 945, 959–69 (2005) (discussing requirements for showing that mark is “famous”). 
143 See Jonathan R. Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1280 (2004) 
(“Trade secret law enhances exclusivity and thereby increases innovation by supplanting the precautions that an innovator must 
take to guard the secrecy of her information.”). 
144 Landes & Posner, supra note 109, at 294; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 64, at 41–42. 
145 Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.).  Other risks include the possibility that the 
secret may leak or that the inventor will forfeit his right to a patent if he does not apply within year after the invention was “in 
public use or on sale.”  Id.; see also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (stating that 
patents provide monopoly as reward for inventions, but that “the quid pro quo is disclosure . . . .”). 
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associated with attempts to secure patents,146 but this answer purports to reduce trade secret to a 
kind of second-class intellectual property protection for relatively unimportant innovations. 
Another justification for trade secret law is that the law is trying to minimize what 
otherwise would be significant social costs associated with self-help remedies.147  This 
justification may be correct, but it depends upon the answer to an empirical question—would the 
social costs associated with self-help be greater than the social costs associated with trade secret 
law, such as litigation?148  Moreover, the law could limit self-help costs by affirmatively 
requiring information disclosure, for example through a hypothetical Freedom of Information 
Act that applied to the private sector.  As long as third parties were required to pay for the 
transactions costs associated with information requests,149 third parties would seek information 
only when the benefits to them were greater than the production costs.  Reducing self-help may 
                                                 
146 Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret 
Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 139 (1999) (“Because trade secret law provides cost-efficient, dependable legal rights, it reduces 
the inventor’s incentive to pursue the patent alternative.”). 
147 See Micheal Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets? 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007) (“[I]f information can be 
kept secret through self-help, then owners will spend more money to keep the information secret even in the absence of the 
law.”). 
148 Courts do insist, as a prerequisite to trade secret protection, that the owners of a trade secret make some effort to keep it 
secret.  See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining, in criminal appeal for conviction of 
dealing in trade secrets, whether owner of trade secret took reasonable measures to keep information secret); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
1839(3)(A) (providing that, in order to have trade secret, owner must have “taken reasonable measures to keep such information 
secret”).  But they do not seek to determine whether self-help would be more efficient than trade secret protection in individual 
cases. 
149 Such payments are required under the Freedom of Information Act.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2006).   
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be a partial justification for trade secret doctrine, but it seems empirically questionable and 
incomplete. 
A clue to improving our understanding of trade secret law lies in the recognition that it 
extends not only to technological information that may be difficult or costly to produce but also 
to nontechnological information like customer lists and sales figures.150  This aspect of trade 
secret law is difficult to explain using the two justifications for trade secret law given above.  
The incentive-to-produce theory cannot justify protection for nontechnological data because that 
sort of information would be produced in the ordinary course of business even if intellectual 
property law did not provide any special incentive to produce it.  Meanwhile, given the existence 
of disclosure requirements for organizations such as public corporations,151 affirmative disclosure 
regimes might appear to be viable alternatives to trade secrets for accounting information in 
particular. 
Justifying trade secret law as an appropriate social subsidy to encourage market 
experimentation makes for a more solid foundation.  This view accounts for why trade secret law 
protects information such as customer lists and other data that would be naturally produced 
during the ordinary course of business.  The goal of trade secret law is not to encourage the 
production of that information so much as the production of the business.  Sometimes, of course, 
a business’s success will be difficult to disguise, but even then there might be uncertainty about 
whether the business is so successful to justify entry of a competitor.  The law protects whatever 
business data can be hidden, thus discouraging subsequent entry and increasing a first entrant’s 
                                                 
150 See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 485 F.3d 930 (2007) (holding that customer information was trade secret under 
Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (requiring material disclosure of information about securities offered for public sale). 
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expected share of rents, creating stronger incentives for the market experiments that produce the 
data.152  On our theory, trade secret law may be overinclusive—it protects copycat businesses 
too—but, in general, innovators may be the businesses that have the most information worth 
protecting. 
C. Copyright 
A market experimentation theory has also been invoked as part of the explanation for the 
existence of copyright.  As then Professor Breyer noted in 1970, copyright has historically been 
justified in terms of the incentives not only for authors, but for publishers too.153 Indeed, 
“[h]istorically the publisher led the fight for laws that allow him to obtain exclusive rights,”154 
and in at least some markets, an important part of the publisher’s costs is the investments in 
publishing “books of unpredictable future popularity.”155  Without copyright, publishers might be 
willing to invest less in books of unpredictable popularity – like “an author’s first novel” – 
because “competition will diminish the size of the best seller’s payoff” and thus make 
publication a less attractive “gamble.”156  As Landes and Posner recognize, a publisher cannot 
                                                 
152 See Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006) 
153 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 281, 292 (1970).  
154 Id.   
155 Id. at 302.  
156 Id. at 312; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 40-41 (noting that the problem of recouping the costs of writing 
and publishing a work is magnified “by the fact that the author’s cost of creating the work, and many publishing costs …, are 
incurred before it is known what demand for the work will be” and that the copyist may avoid that risk by waiting “until he 
knows whether the work is a success” prior to investing in publication) 
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eliminate this risk through building a large and diversified portfolio of works because “even a 
diversified publisher will be at risk of losing his upside if his competitors are to copy his 
successful works.”157 
A market experimentation theory can provide at least a partial explanation for some of 
the oddities of copyright law.  For example, it is well-known that copyright terms of protection 
have grown dramatically longer over the past 200 years.  Current terms of protection are nearly 
equal to or exceeding a century in length.158  The additional years of protection recently added to 
the copyright term159 seem little justified in terms of providing an incentive to the original author 
to create the work.160 If such lengthy terms are justified (a matter on which there remains 
considerable debate),161 a market experimentation theory provides a better justification than an 
incentive-to-create theory.  The decision to run an additional printing of an old book or a new 
release of an old film, accompanied with a sufficient marketing campaign to inform consumers, 
                                                 
157  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 41.   
158 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978 . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of 
the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”). 
159 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302).   
160 Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 
(No. 01-618). 
161 For critiques arguing that the copyright term is too long, see generally Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create 
Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration: Lessons From a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002) (arguing that although life-plus-years term of Copyright Act provides strong incentives to produce 
copyrighted works, extension of years portion of duration does not increase those incentives); see also Marci A. Hamilton, 
Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996) (suggesting that not 
enough empirical research has been conducted to base justification for copyright term extensions on incentives to create).  For a 
defense of the long copyright term, at least for derivative works, see Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative 
Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 366 (2005). 
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may be a highly risky business venture.  It is, in effect, a test of the current market for the book 
or film.  In the absence of copyright protection, the risk is borne entirely by the first mover.  If 
the work is not protected by copyright and the market proves favorable, second movers and 
consumers would reap a significant portion of the benefits.  Yet, if the risk borne by the first-
mover is too great and the portion of the benefits realized too little, the market test will never 
occur.162  Consumers may be better off permitting the first mover to reap more benefits so that 
there are more market tests, and thereby a greater diversity of works, including old works.  
As we have stressed, however, the market experimentation theory does not necessarily 
lead to more and more expansive theories of intellectual property.  Lengthening copyright terms 
may be a sensible response where, in the absence of a property right, no one would have an 
incentive to republish the work.163  It is much more difficult to justify lengthening copyrights on 
wildly popular works, like Mickey Mouse films, because little market uncertainty currently 
exists with respect to such works.  Long copyright terms are thus a somewhat crude mechanism 
for encouraging market experiments on works that have yet failed to attract public attention.  In 
this case, recognizing the market experimentation concerns would likely lead to a more 
circumscribed right to lengthy copyrights. 
                                                 
162 Landes and Posner make a similar point in justifying a system of indefinitely renewable copyrights.  See William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 488–89 (2003) (considering incentives to 
resurrect works of forgotten novelist whose works have fallen into public domain).  They do not, however, acknowledge that the 
point furnishes a broader argument for intellectual property protection of market experimentation, nor do they note that their 
point may apply even to new editions or releases of readily remembered works. 
163 See supra notes 158 to 166 and the accompanying text. 
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Similarly, in the areas of derivative rights, market experimentation may help to explain 
not so much the extent but the allocation of rights.  Under current copyright law,164 the creator of 
a first work had broad rights to derivative works based on the initial work.  The rules of 
derivative works involve not so much a broadening of copyrights but reallocation of rights from 
the creator of the derivative work in favor of the creator of the original work.  Under an incentive 
to create theory, broad derivative rights present a conundrum:  The broader right granted to the 
copyright of the initial work might increase the incentives to create that initial work, but it also 
reduces the incentives for others to create the derivative works.  The counterbalancing effect 
might lead to the creation of fewer works, and the incentive-to-create theory cannot easily justify 
the law’s preference for the creator of the initial work over the creator of the derivative work.  
Market experimentation does justify the preference.  An initial work will almost certainly face 
more risk than a derivative work if for no other reason than that creators of derivative works can 
avoid making derivatives of flops.  No one invests in sequels to Ishtar, Heaven’s Gate, or The 
Adventures of Pluto Nash,165 while it is fairly easy to predict that Shrek II & III had better 
chances of success than the average movie.  The right to the derivative work is thus allocated to 
the work that bears the higher level of market risk, and this increases the incentives to bear the 
                                                 
164 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom 
of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (2002) (arguing for different intellectual property regime with 
greatly reduced protection for derivative rights). 
165 According to Wikipedia, these are three of the least successful films ever: The failure of Heaven’s Gate is credited with 
bankrupting the prominent studio United Artists; Ishtar was a “notorious bomb” despite a cast including stars Dustin Hoffman 
and Warren Beatty; and Pluto Nash is said to hold the current record as the biggest box office loser, with a net lost of $92 
million. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_US_box_office_bombs.  
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greater risks in creating truly innovative characters or plots,166 even though it may decrease the 
number of derivative works that are produced from works that turn out to be successful. 
Finally, market experimentation may suggest that copyrights should be narrowed in some 
fields where the costs of distribution, and thus costs of markets experiments, have fallen 
dramatically. Internet distribution of music and writings is a standard example where new 
technologies have dramatically decreased distribution costs.167  Though we are not convinced 
that some degree of copyright protection cannot be justified on the basis of the incentive to create 
theory, or that the reduction in distribution costs has eliminated the riskiness of underwriting new 
music (perhaps the real cost lies in the advertising campaign that educates potential consumers as 
to the value of the work), we nonetheless must agree that reductions in distribution costs reduce 
the costs of market experiments and therefore raise the question whether copyright needs 
contraction.    
Ultimately, however, copyright law is probably the area of intellectual property that least 
advances our thesis.  The problem is that copyright is simply too narrow to encourage much 
experimentation.  If someone has an idea for a new type of book that turns out to be successful, 
then others can write similar books and compete with the original.  The markets for readers, 
listeners, and viewers are like any other markets, and there will generally be insufficient 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (explaining that there will be greater incentives to promote 
novel if no one else will be able to copy its expressive content). 
167 See Raymong Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 
69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 294-296 (2002) (arguing that the recent dramatic decrease in the costs of distributing songs undermines 
part of the justification for copyright in the field); Breyer, supra note ___, at 299 (accurately predicting that the advent of 
computers lower the costs of initial publishing by, for example, “eliminating the cost of retyping copy on, for example, a linotype 
machine” and “lower[ing] inventory costs by making possible the printing of books ‘on demand.,” and arguing that such possible 
developments may weaken the case for copyright).  
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incentives for writers, musicians, and movie studios to undertake risky experiments whose 
primary value would come from encouraging new work from competitors.  Even worse, 
someone who undertakes the expensive experiment of compiling a large but unoriginal data set 
cannot rely on copyright to protect even the data compiled,168 let alone the idea of attempting to 
compile similar sets.  Though there may well be sound reasons for these limitations, many 
aspects of copyright law thus do not seem finely tuned to encouraging market experimentation. 
D. Patents 
In the modern era, the standard justification for patents is that they are necessary to 
encourage the production of useful technological information.169  This justification accounts for 
many of patent law’s major features, including (1) the requirement that the patentee provide a 
complete and enabling disclosure of the patented subject matter;170 (2) the prohibition against 
patenting non-novel or obvious subject matter, with novelty and nonobviousness defined on the 
basis of all or nearly all information that is publicly available anywhere in the world;171 and (3) 
the general absence of any requirement that the patentee actually commercialize the patented 
                                                 
168 See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  
169 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (“First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention . . . .”) 
(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bircon Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974)); see also, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2003) (arguing that modern applications of patent law promote innovation 
non-uniformly between different high-technology industries). 
170 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also J.E.M. Agric. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 142 
(2002) (stating assumption that “[t]he disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude’”)(quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).. 
171 See id. § 102 (novelty); id. § 103 (nonobviousness). 
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subject matter.172  Nevertheless, a market experimentation theory provides an explanation for 
certain patent practices.  We outline four such doctrines below.  For the first two, we are 
somewhat critical and show how these practices can lead to inefficient results unless other 
modifications of patent doctrine are also made.  For the second pair, we view the doctrines more 
favorably but suggest some modifications.   
Two features of modern U.S.  patent law—the recognition of business method patents173 
and the weakening of the traditional nonobviousness standard174—are quite plainly linked to a 
theory of market experimentation.  We can make this assertion with confidence because both of 
these two developments were pioneered and encouraged by Judge Giles Rich, who expressly 
endorsed the view that patent law should be designed to provide “an inducement to risk an 
attempt to commercialize the invention.”175  That “‘business’ aspect of the matter,” Rich argued, 
“is responsible for the actual delivery of the invention into the hands of the public.” 176  Although 
Rich did not consider the possibility of providing exclusive rights where there was no invention 
                                                 
172 See id. § 271(d)(4); see also Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (holding that patent is not 
unenforceable merely because patentee neglected to use it). 
173 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
174 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Commerce and Equivalence: Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 373–74 (2000-2001) (asserting that, before creation of Federal Circuit, patents were 
invalidated on basis of obviousness in two-thirds or more of cases where patent was found invalid, but that proportion dropped to 
as low as one-fifth following creation of the Federal Circuit, suggesting that “obviousness is much less central in appellate 
determinations of patent validity under the Federal Circuit”).  But see KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 
(2007) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s approach to determine whether patent is obvious). 
175 Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pt. 2) 159, 177 (1942). 
176 Id. 
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of any kind, he believed that the public benefits of commercialization provided a core 
justification for the patent system.   
Over a half century after then-lawyer Rich wrote those words, business method patents 
became recognized by U.S.  courts in State Street Bank & Trust v.  Signature Financial Group 
Inc.,177 an opinion authored by Judge Rich.  In some circumstances, business method patents can 
be justified without resort to a theory of encouraging commercialization or market 
experimentation.  For example, the creation of an innovative technique in business, such as the 
Black-Scholes method for pricing options,178 might be viewed as highly similar to the production 
of new technological information in a field of engineering, broadly conceived.  But this category 
of business innovations may not exhaust the class of business methods patents that have been 
issued by the U.S.  PTO.  In 2005, for example, the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office once held that a business method patent need not make any 
“technological” contribution to the art.179  Such nontechnological business patents might be 
                                                 
177 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998). 
178 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).; see 
also F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent 
Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1176 n.6 (2003) (describing history and utility of Black-Scholes formula). 
179 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 2005). We note that the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences has recently changed course on this issue.  See _____.  The Federal Circuit also seems to be trying to cut back on 
State Street and to curtail the availability of business method patents.  Our point in the text is merely that, for some period of 
time, the U.S. PTO was willing to issue business method patents without necessarily demanding that the patents disclosed 
nonobvious technical information (broadly construed).  The Federal Circuit’s apparent willingness to cut back on all method 
patents – including those that offer nonobvious insights into complex arts such as finance, arbitration and risk management – 
raises other issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.   
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justified on the grounds that they encourage the development and market testing of 
“economically nonobvious” business methods. 180    
Another major development of U.S. patent law starting in the late twentieth century was 
the weakening of the traditional nonobviousness standard.181 The traditional view of 
nonobviousness requires the patent specification to have revealed some significant new 
technological information.182  Between 1982 and 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit dramatically weakened this standard of obviousness by requiring proof of a teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation in the prior art before any permutation of old technology could be 
considered obvious.183  In taking this step, the Federal Circuit was led by Judge Rich.184  Such a 
                                                 
180 By “economically nonobvious” business methods, we mean methods of doing business that can be launched without any new 
information but that have uncertain prospects as to whether they could possibly succeed.  For example, in 1998, no one would 
have needed any additional information to create a business like Netflix; the reason it was not created was because its chances of 
market success were so uncertain.   
181 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 174, at 370–94 (discussing vitiation of nonobviousness requirement in Federal Circuit). 
182 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11–18 (1966) (holding that Patent Act of 1952 embraces objective doctrine of 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851) for establishing nonobviousness, requiring that, in comparison with 
previous art, patent must evince some innovation beyond foresight of person having ordinary skill in pertinent art). 
183 See, e.g., In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 995–96 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Pro-Mold v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568, 
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Scholarly commentary roundly criticized this teaching-suggestion-motivation test as too lax on patent 
invalidation.  See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 174, at 379 (offering “suggestion test” as factor in the vitiation of nonobviousness 
requirement).  The Supreme Court ultimately held that this test of obviousness was too constrained.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (“The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words 
teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of 
issued patents.”)\; see also John F. Duffy, Commentary, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure 
in the Judiciary, 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 34 (2007), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/duffy.pdf (discussing the author’s involvement in the KSR litigation 
and the effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case). 
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watering down of the nonobviousness standard is difficult to justify if the sole goal of patent law 
is to encourage the production of new technological information.  If, on the other hand, the 
patent system is designed to encourage the commercialization of new (but not necessarily 
technologically innovative) products, then the weakening of the nonobviousness standard is at 
least understandable.  Indeed, a logical extension of the theory would permit patents to issue on 
products that were technologically non-novel, provided that they did not already exist in the 
marketplace. 
In recognizing that these first two developments in U.S. patent law could be justified on 
the grounds of encouraging market experimentation, we do not mean to suggest that promoting 
market experimentation is more important than promoting technological experimentation.  Nor 
do we believe that business method patents and the watering down of the nonobviousness 
standard are necessarily positive developments.  To the contrary, we believe these developments 
could lead to dramatically inefficient results unless other aspects of patent law are also modified.  
Most importantly, current U.S. patent law does not require a patentee to bring the invention to 
market,185 does not try evaluate the economic nonobviousness of proposed , and does not 
consider the post-patenting commercialization exclusively by individuals other than the patentee 
as a reason to invalidate an issued patent.186  In combination, these features of patent law provide 
an opportunity for patentees to free ride off the efforts of the true first movers in a field.187  
                                                                                                                                                             
184 See generally George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 
32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 509–58 (1999) (discussing Judge Rich’s deep contributions to evolution and application of 
obviousness doctrine in U.S. courts). 
185 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4); See also Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (“[I]t is the privilege of 
any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”). 
186 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (holding that MercExchange’s lack of commercial activity does 
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A good example is provided by the recent “BlackBerry” litigation.188 The patentee in that 
case held broad patents on the technological capability of sending e-mail via a wireless network 
to a wireless device.189 Technologically, these patents were highly suspect and most likely 
obvious.190   It is nonetheless possible to believe that the development and commercialization of a 
wireless e-mail product entailed enormous market risks, though those risks were economic and 
nontechnological.  But if so, those risks were borne by Research in Motion (RIM), the first 
mover that developed and commercialized the BlackBerry.191 The patent system produced what 
                                                                                                                                                             
not preclude its right to injunction after finding of willful infringement).  Further, the district courts and the Federal Circuit did 
not consider the lack of commercial use when considering validity of the patents in question in NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, 
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (NTP was patent-holding company); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (MercExchange no longer used patented technology); and Eolas Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Eolas was not commercializing patented technology). 
187 See, e.g., Sean M. O’Conner, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment Risks After Medimmune v. 
Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 381, 384 (2007) (describing the operation of “patent trolls” who do not commercialize their 
patents and wait until another party infringes on them). 
188 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006); see also Ian 
Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue Service, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2006, at C1 (providing brief history of litigation, which 
culminated in settlement award to NTP of $612.5 million). 
189 For a description of NTP’s patents-in-suit, which contemplate the receipt of electronic mail to a wireless portable RF 
receiver, see NTP, 418 F.3d. at 1288–90.  No particular wireless network (beyond the source and receiver) is contemplated in 
NTP’s patents, nor do the patents detail a method for sending messages from the receiver.  Id.  The court compares this to 
Research In Motion’s more particularized system, which incorporates server-end software, nationwide mobile wireless networks, 
and a method for sending messages from the RF receiver.  Id. 
190 The PTO decided to reconsider the validity of the patents while the litigation was pending.  See Teresa Riordan, The Battle 
over Blackberry Heads to a Crucial Court Date, and a Challenge of More Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2003, at C1. 
191 See Sofy Carayannopoulos, Research in Motion: A Small Firm Commercializing a New Technology, 29 ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
THEORY & PRAC. 219, 219–25 (2005) (providing history of RIM and notes on development, production and marketing of 
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
80 
is, in our view, a startlingly backwards result:  RIM was forced to pay more than a half billion 
dollars192 to a patentee who had contributed little or nothing to technological advances and had 
risked nothing in the commercialization of the technology.193 Rather than rewarding the first 
mover, the patent system imposed an unjustified tax upon the company.194 
Two other patent law doctrines show that considerations of market experimentation can 
be deployed more subtly to adjust rights.  In MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a district court must use the “traditional [equitable test] that governs the award 
of injunctive relief” in determining whether to issue injunctions in patent cases.195  In an 
influential concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stressed that in deciding to withhold injunctive 
relief, court should consider whether the patentee is “us[ing] patents not as a basis for producing 
                                                                                                                                                             
BlackBerry system). 
192 See Austen, supra note 188, at C1. 
193 See Mike Huglett, Blurry on Blackberry, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2006, at C1 (explaining that Thomas Campana, Jr., inventor of 
patents-at-suit, founded NTP merely in order to “work out licensing agreements for [his] patents”). 
194 Before the settlement, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office indicated that, upon review, it would likely find several, if not 
all, of NTP’s patents to be invalid.  See Ian Austen, U.S. Patent Office Likely to Back BlackBerry Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2005, at C5.  Indeed, the PTO found two of the nine disputed patents to be invalid before RIM ultimately settled with NTP.  See 
Bloomberg News, Ruling for Maker of BlackBerry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at C4 (reporting nonfinal ruling by USPTO that 
one of NTP’s patents was invalid); Ruling May Help BlackBerry Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at C4 (reporting two final 
actions by USPTO that found two NTP patents invalid).  Yet RIM remained under tremendous practical pressure to settle the 
litigation because it faced the strong likelihood that the district court would issue an injunction shutting down RIM’s service prior 
to the government’s final resolution of the reexamination proceedings.   See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 
2d 785, 786–89 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that District Court and Federal Circuit had denied four previous attempts by RIM to stay 
proceedings during the reexamination of NTP’s patents). 
195 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) 
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
81 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”196  That view, which lower 
courts seem to be following,197 is consistent with a market experimentation theory.  On the 
margin, the law should favor firms risking market entry over firms that avoid such risk.   Those 
who invest in bringing a technology to market should be entitled to slightly more generous 
remedies if they are patentees, and slightly greater accommodation if they are defendants in 
infringement actions.  Here a market experimentation theory justifies both a slight expansion and 
a slight contraction  of baseline rights.   
Similarly, U.S. patent law has frequently looked to commercialization efforts in deciding 
the scope and validity of patents.  Under the so-called “paper patent” doctrine, U.S. courts have 
in the past distinguished between patents that remain merely pieces of paper issued by a 
government agency and those that are made into commercial products.  In a variety of 
circumstances, the paper patent doctrine either extended or limited patent rights depending on the 
commercialization.  In deciding questions of infringement, court frequently held that a paper 
patent was to be given more narrow interpretation than a commmercialized patent.198  Also in 
determining a patent’s validity, courts would discount prior art references that were merely paper 
patents and thus allow patentees to patent subject matter that was closer to uncommercialized 
prior art than would have been permitted if the prior art had been commercialized.199  Finally, 
                                                 
196  Id. at 1649.   
197  See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2007) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in the course of denying MercExchange’s request for an injunction).   
198  See, e.g., Wire Tie Mach. Co. v. Pacific Box Corp., 102 F.2d 543, 556 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding a patent on an innovation 
never “utilized or placed upon the market” to be “a paper patent” that would not be given “any broader scope than it is clearly 
required to be given”).  
199 Power Curbers, Inc. v. E. D. Etnyre & Co., 298 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1962) (rejecting the argument that a successful patent 
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courts would count successful commercialization of an invention in favor of sustaining the 
validity of the patent.200   Though the paper patent doctrine has fallen out of favor (perhaps 
because it was hard to reconcile with the dominant view that the patent system encourages the 
production and disclosure of technical information),201 our analysis suggest that the paper patent 
doctrine may have served a useful economic function in encouraging and protecting market 
experiments and that a revitalization of the doctrine may be in order.   
One aspect of the paper patent doctrine survives in modern validity analysis. While U.S. 
patent law has no clear doctrine permitting the nonobvious feature of the invention to be related 
solely to commercialization (as opposed to technical achievement),202 it does allow for 
                                                                                                                                                             
should be viewed as an obvious variation of “a number of old paper patents” and reasoning that patents “for useful inventions 
ought not be invalidated and held for naught because of such excursions into the boneyard of failures and abandoned 
experiments”).  
200 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1944) (counting the patentee’s commercial 
success in favor of sustaining the patent where the patentee was the first to market the product and the product “met with 
immediate commercial success”); compare Todd v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1954) (invalidating a 
patent determined to be “mere paper patent which has never been put into production”); Air Reduction Co. v. Carbo-Oxygen Co., 
17 F.2d 138, 142 (D. Del. 1926) (holding patent invalid based in part on the finding that “the patent is purely a paper patent [that] 
has made no imprint upon the art”), aff’d 19 F.2d 1014 (3rd Cir. 1927) (expressing adopting the district judge’s reasoning on the 
paper patent issue); Schweyer Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Reading Co., 63 F.2d 402, 405 (3rd Cir. 1933) (viewing a patent on a device 
not “successful enough to warrant the risk of installation and use” to be a “theoretical or paper patent” and invalidating it for want 
of invention).   
201 Frank B. Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp., 188 F.2d 940, 942 (2nd Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.) (disparaging the phrase, “paper 
patent” as “a mere bit of rhetoric, usually employed as a makeweight by judges who wish to support the patent in suit, but are 
embarrassed by a reference, of an escape from which they are not too confident. It is a meaningless platitude.refusing to 
invalidate a patent on the basis of its similarity to prior art”). 
202 A proposal for awarding patents on the basis of commercial nonobviousness is set forth in Karen I. Boyd, Nonobviousness 
and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 337–43 
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commercial success to be considered as a factor in the nonobviousness analysis.203  Thus, if the 
commercializer can make even a relatively modest change to previously known subject matter, 
the modified invention may be patentable if it is commercially successful and the previously 
known version was not.  Nevertheless, current U.S. law on this subject has several confusing and 
undesirable features.204  The law requires a “nexus” to exist between the alleged invention and 
the invention’s commercial success.205 The application of that “nexus” test is fraught with 
uncertainty and, if the commercializer’s real contribution lies merely in testing the commercial 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1997).  Boyd’s analysis differs significantly from ours because she argues that patents would be helpful where commercial 
success is uncertain as a result of the risk aversion of potential commercial innovators.  See id. at 337–38.  Our analysis does not 
depend on risk aversion, but instead focuses on the possibility that second and subsequent movers can free-ride on first-movers’ 
market experiments by copying successes while avoid failures.  See supra Part III.  Boyd considers the issue only in the context 
of biotechnology inventions.  See Boyd, supra, at 312-13.  We believe that the problem is more general.   
203 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (listing “commercial success” among secondary factors in considering 
whether patent is obvious or not); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (reaffirming obviousness 
test in Graham); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 736–57 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that secondary 
factors, or “objective indicia,” play essential role in 35 U.S.C. § 103 determinations).  But see Robert P. Merges, Commercial 
Success and Patent Standards, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 838–66 (1988) (arguing that commercial success may not necessarily be 
result of patented technology itself, but rather of efficient and effective marketing of such technology). 
204 See Reed W. L. Marcy, Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement: The Effect of Inconsistent Standards Regarding 
Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 199, 209 (1996).   
205   
“Commercial success is relevant because the law presumes an idea would successfully have been brought to market sooner, in 
response to market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the art.  Thus, the law deems evidence of (1) 
commercial success, and (2) some causal relation or ‘nexus’ between an invention and commercial success of a product 
embodying that invention, probative of whether an invention was non-obvious.”  
Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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viability of the product or in explaining the benefits of the innovation to the public, then the 
nexus requirement may be deemed to be not satisfied. 
Our analysis suggests two possible reforms in the evaluation of commercial success as a 
secondary consideration in the nonobviousness inquiry.  First, the courts should consider only 
the commercialization efforts of the patentee or parties licensed by the patentee to justify a 
finding that the patent was nonobvious.  If the defendant in an infringement trial or a third party 
engaged in successful commercialization of a patent without a patent’s protections against 
second-movers, then the patent cannot be defended as necessary, at least in part, to encourage 
investment in commercialization.206 Such an inference will not always mean that the patent 
should be held invalid, especially if there is evidence that the defendant or third party learned of 
the technology through the patent itself or the patentee’s disclosures.  But the theory of market 
experimentation at least could operate at the margins of patent law to favor those who 
commercialize over those who do not.  In otherwise close cases (and cases in which secondary 
considerations become relevant tend to be close), it may be sensible to decide against a patentee 
who has not engaged in commercialization and in favor of a defendant who has. At the very 
least, a patentee ought not benefit from the weak inference that a defendant’s commercial 
success establishes nonobviousness. 
Second, courts should not discount findings of commercial success merely because that 
commercial success resulted from marketing expertise rather than technological skill by the 
patentee.  We concede that the courts’ desire not to count commercial success resulting from 
marketing excellence is somewhat supported by the theory that patents are aimed at producing 
                                                 
206 We do not mean to imply that independent invention always signifies obviousness.  Different parties may hit on a 
nonobvious invention at the same time.  For an argument that independent invention should be a defense to patent infringement, 
see generally, Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
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valuable technical information.  Under that theory, commercial success may indicate that the 
patented good sits in a niche in product space,207 indicating the likelihood of some important 
technical difference between the patent and other products.  Nonetheless, the line between 
technological and marketing prowess can often be a fine one,208 and marketing can sometimes be 
successful in helping to illustrate, for customers, the distinctiveness of a particular product.  
Once again, our claim is not that marketing expertise alone should be sufficient to generate a 
patent under current U.S.  law, but that in close cases, socially useful market experimentation at 
least ought not count against a patentee.209 
                                                 
207 Industrial organization analysis frequently makes use of the concept of multi-dimensional product space, in which each 
product’s location depends on its unique characteristics.  See, e.g., Andrew S. Caplin & Barry J. Nalebuff, Multi-Dimensional 
Product Differentiation and Price Competition, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 129 (1986) (seeking to develop multi-dimensional 
location model). 
208 Consider, for example, the envelopes that NetFlix uses to send and receive DVDs to and from its customers.  U.S. Patent No. 
6,966,484 (filed Sept. 16, 2002).  One might characterize these envelopes either as a technological feat or as marketing genius. 
209 Unlike the United States, at least one country seems more open to the possibility of allowing patents based merely on 
commercial nonobviousness.  India’s newly amended patent statute provides that the standard of patentability, or inventive step, 
can be satisfied by a feature of an invention that either involves a “technical advance” or has “economic significance.”  The 
Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005 § 2(1)(ja) (Gazette of India Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure), available at 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual-2052005.pdf.  Commentators are divided as to the intended doctrinal 
significance of this change.  Compare Manoj Pillai, India: India’s Patents Bill, 2005—Is It TRIPS Compliant (Mar. 31, 2005), 
available at http://www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp_Q_articleid_E_31717 (“By bringing ‘economic significance’ under the 
definition of ‘non-obviousness’ what has been fundamentally diluted is a cardinal principle of patent law!”) with Archana 
Shanker, What Patent Owners Need to Know, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Patent Focus 2005, at 50(“Such a definition 
is more or less well accepted internationally and in all probability the term economic significance might be interpreted as 
synonymous to industrial application.”).  The invention still is required to be “not obvious to a person skilled in the art,” but the 
structure of the statute suggests that the nonobvious quality may be economic or technical.  This statutory language at least opens 
the possibility that patents could issue on technically trivial variations of prior art if the modified invention is successfully 
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We conclude our analysis of the patent system by asking the daring question whether the 
U.S. patent system be modified to provide rewards solely for the commercialization without 
rewarding pretenders? We believe that current patent doctrine does have some flexibility to 
achieve this end, though we worry that the institutional structure of the system may be poor at 
identifying examples of commercial nonobviousness.210  A pure theory of patents for market 
experimentation would permit not only patents on smallish variations of previously failed 
innovations (which current law already does in part), but also patents on products that are not 
novel but have never been effectively commercialized.  Consider a prophetic invention that was 
previously patented but never commercialized.  The patent has now expired.  Black-letter patent 
law precludes a new patent from claiming precisely the same invention, but patent law also 
allows attorneys to be creative in drafting patent claim language to avoid prior art.211 The 
attorney defines “novelty” in the drafting of the claim.  This feature of patent law holds out the 
theoretical possibility that the attorney could distinguish noncommercialized prior art by 
restricting a claim to the “successfully commercialized” product. 
                                                                                                                                                             
commercialized and if that economic success would have been nonobvious to a person of skill in the art.   
210 It is difficult enough for the patent office to handle its workload in identifying technological obviousness.  The PTO has 
issued more than one million patents over the past seven years; it took more than 75 years after the office was created for its first 
million patents.  See Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types Issued Since 1836 (available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm).  Patent examiners spend only about eighteen hours on each 
patent and the bonus system rewards examiners for issuing as many patents as quickly possible.  Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1500 (2001).   Given its large workload and the small amount of time 
spent on each patent, the PTO is probably not equipped to effectively implement a new system to determine commercial 
nonobviousness. 
211 See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
MARKET EXPERIMENTATION 
 
87 
One famous and analogous example of such artful claim drafting is found in the patent at 
issue in Parke-Davis & Co.  v.  H.K.  Mulford & Co.212 The case involved a patent claim to a 
purified natural substance (adrenaline).  The claim was attacked as invalid because the substance 
itself was naturally occurring and therefore, the argument went, the patent claim was not novel.  
In rejecting that argument, Judge Learned Hand reasoned the claim to the purified natural 
substance should be recognized as novel because it was “for every practical purpose a new thing 
commercially and therapeutically.”213 Hand stressed that there were “ample practical differences” 
between the claimed purified substance and the prior natural substance, and that the line between 
the novel and not novel should be “drawn rather from the common usages of men than from nice 
considerations of dialectic.”214 Judge Hand’s reasoning now undergirds entire fields of patenting; 
for example, most patents on DNA are claimed in the Parke-Davis format.215 Recognizing a 
claim to a “commercialized” product as novel despite an earlier patent or other document 
disclosing the precise same product would be no more doctrinally difficult than the step taken by 
Judge Hand in Parke-Davis.  Commercialized inventions are “for every practical purpose a new 
thing commercially” even if the prior art discloses an uncommercialized version of identical 
technology. 
Admittedly, courts might well reject such an approach, perhaps on the ground that it 
would effect a major change to the patent system rather than simply an accommodate a new 
                                                 
212 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).  
213 Id. at 103. 
214 Id. 
215 After Parke-Davis, courts have recognized patents on other naturally occurring products in a purified or created form.  DNA 
patent claims, for example, are drafted to “clearly define an isolated and purified DNA molecule.” Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the 
Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 741 (2005). 
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technology, as in Parke-Davis.216 Moreover, if the patent system were to permit patents on 
commercially new and nonobvious developments, it would need to ensure (1) that such 
developments really were commercially nonobvious and (2) that the patentee (or the patentee’s 
licensee) actually bore the risks of commercialization.  The latter restriction may be the easier of 
the two to achieve.  Where a patentee has obtained a patent on the grounds that 
commercialization of the product is the difficult and nonobvious step, the patent could be 
invalidated if the patentee did not engage in commercialization.217 In such a case, the courts 
would refuse to recognize the patentee as the true “inventor” of the commercialized version.  
Similarly, if other parties engaged in commercialization in parallel with the patentee, those 
parallel efforts would provide strong evidence that commercialization was not risky and the 
economic prospects of the commercialized product were not nonobvious. 
Despite these limitations to existing patent doctrine, “commercialization patents” could 
still produce economic harm if the patent office were generally unable to identify instances of 
commercial nonobviousness.  If the patent office issued patents on developments that could 
                                                 
216 The Parke-Davis approach, however, should be recognized in a subset of cases in which the inventor’s achievement is in 
identifying a naturally occurring phenomenon for market experimentation.  Consider, for example, Allerca’s identification of cats 
that have a mutation that prevents them from producing dander and thus causing allergies.  See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Cat Lovers 
Lining Up for No-Sneeze Kitties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005.  On our view, Allerca should be able to patent the cats that have been 
screened and commercialized, not just the test for identifying such cats. 
217 Even this inquiry might be difficult, because patentees might seek to engage in minimal commercialization just to preserve 
their patent rights.  See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 41, on file with author).  Pseudo-commercialization might be harmful both because it might 
involve wasteful expenditure and because it might succeed in converting a true commercial innovator into an infringer.  Courts 
would thus need to ensure that the patentee engaged in sufficient commercialization to produce a conclusion on whether 
commercialization was economically feasible. 
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obviously be successfully commercialized, those patents should be invalidated by the courts if 
multiple parties besides the patentee engage in simultaneous commercialization.  In theory, the 
prospect of invalidation may be sufficient to encourage competitors to enter the market despite 
the existence of the patent.  But the patent may chill entry if, as seems likely, competitors view 
litigation as risky and uncertain.218 A common uncertainty would be whether additional entry 
occurred independent of the patentee’s efforts or as a result of the patentee’s market experiments.  
And in the absence of widespread entry, a question would be whether additional entry would 
have occurred but for the prospect of litigation. 
Thus, commercialization patents may be economically beneficial only if the patent office 
is sufficiently good at identifying instances of commercial nonobviousness.  The current 
structure of the patent office, under which a single examiner evaluates the merits of an 
application, seems unlikely to produce accurate judgments about market viability. Indeed 
historically, the patent office has tried to avoid making judgments about marketability.  A 
different institutional structure might help.  The patent office is now engaged in a new 
experiment to provide for “peer review” of patent applications.219 Under this method, the patent 
office widely distributes patent applications by posting them on the Internet.220 In theory then, the 
                                                 
218 Patent litigation is already notoriously uncertain.  Claim construction disputes are not finally resolved until the parties are 
before the Federal Circuit even though parties are required to fully litigate their claims either through trial or summary judgment 
prior to proceeding to the Federal Circuit in the first place.  See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in 
Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 203–09 (2001) 
(discussing uncertainty associated with claim construction). 
219 See Pilot Concerning Public Submission of Peer Reviewed Prior Art, Official Gazette Notice (USPTO June 6, 2007), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2007/week26/patsuba.htm; http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited Aug. 13, 
2007).  
220 Id. 
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office could receive comments on the patent applications from a large variety of sources.221 A 
similar system might be much better at generating information concerning commercial 
nonobviousness.  Indeed, the applications that under our current system might evoke guffaws 
from peer commentators may be precisely the ones that the patent office should grant, if the 
peers’ ridicule stems from a shared belief that the subject matter in the application is 
commercially fanciful.   
In general, we believe that the proposed modification of the patent system to allow for 
some “commercialization” patents holds sufficient promise that it should be considered in some 
cases where the hurdles to commercialization seem particularly daunting.  An initial experiment 
could be limited to a particular market area in which experiments seem especially unlikely in the 
absence of patent protection.222 Nevertheless, we recognize that the patent system may not be the 
optimal system for encouraging market experimentation and that given institutional realities, 
patent protection could well do more harm than good. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have argued that technical and market experimentation are parallel phenomena, both 
underprovided in the absence of property rights.  Why then have intellectual property practice 
and theory focused on the former to the near exclusion of the latter? A partial answer, we 
believe, lies in Harold Demsetz’s general theory of property rights.  Demsetz noted that 
“property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become 
                                                 
221 Id. 
222 Karen Boyd argues that biotechnology is one such area.  See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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larger than the cost of internalization.”223 Rights in technological innovation may have developed 
later than rights in real and personal property because intellectual property rights are more 
amorphous and the “cost of internalization” is therefore higher.  Rights in market innovation may 
be more amorphous still, and the costs associated with any attempt by government officials to 
delineate these rights individually might have greater costs than benefits.  With growing 
economies, however, the benefits of potential market innovation should increase over time, and 
improved legal technology holds the promise of decreasing the cost of internalization.  As the 
possibility of institutions that can efficiently identify market innovation comes closer, theorists in 
turn should expand their models to incorporate all the types of information that intellectual 
property in theory could protect. 
 A market experimentation theory does not, however, necessarily lead to more and more 
expansive theories of intellectual property.  The current intellectual property doctrine shows that 
the courts and the legislature are sympathetic to the plight of first movers who engage in risky 
market experimentation.  If this desire to foster market experimentation is more explicitly 
recognized, then courts and legislatures may be better able to tailor the law.  As we have shown, 
more explicit recognition of market experimentation might limit copyright terms, decrease a the 
injunction rights of a patentee who did not commercialize vis-à-vis an infringer who did, and 
invalidate “paper patents” that claim trivial technological changes never commercialized by the 
patentee.   
Just as it would be surprising if intellectual property doctrine did not already encourage 
market experimentation to a limited extent, so too would it would be surprising if a few doctrinal 
                                                 
223 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967); see also id. (“Increased 
internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values, changes which stem from the development of new 
technology and the opening of new markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned.”). 
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tweaks could provide close to optimal levels of experimentation.  A likely reason for the law’s 
relative lack of attention to market experimentation is that the relevant institutional players, such 
as patent examiners, legislators, and judges, are not well positioned to make judgments about 
what market experiments deserve protection.  We should expect instead that when we do try to 
imagine institutions that would provide appropriately tailored rights protecting market 
experimentation, these institutions would be very different from existing ones.  Perhaps, they 
may even be sufficiently radical that we can imagine them being implemented only in countries 
in which the need is particularly great,224 or in societies comfortable with novel legal 
mechanisms. 
                                                 
224 See supra notes 50 to 52 and accompanying text (discussing literature on need for intellectual property innovation in 
developing countries. 
